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JURISPRUDENTIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LAW, ESPECIALLY
INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE BASIS FOR TRUE PROGRESS & REFORM
Morse Hyun-Myung Tan*
I. Introduction
Notwithstanding current postmodern 2  wariness
regarding universal, objective norms, an immutable and
perennial jurisprudence of international law3 must hold true
for all people everywhere. 4  If it is not for all people
everywhere, how truly and rightfully "international" or
* Senior Research Fellow, the University of Texas School of Law; JD,
Northwestern University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professors Anthony D'Amato and Victor Rosenblum for
reviewing drafts of this article. Thanks to Anna Sabayrac and Fabio
Moon for their research assistance.
2 See GENE EDWARD VErTH, JR., POSTMODERN TIMES: A CHRISTIAN
GuIDE TO CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AND CULTURE (Crossway Books
1994) (presenting a trenchant evaluation of postmodernism). Richard
Rorty goes so far as to call this culture, sadly enough, "post-
metaphysical." RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY &
SOLEDARITY, intro., ch. 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989). Rorty's term
and work, taken descriptively, accurately takes the pulse of the culture,
but does not provide the best prescription for the malady.
3 Conversation with Anthony D'Amato, Judd and Mary Morris
Leighton Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law
(Spring 2001). D'Amato asserted that jurisprudence serves as the
proper foundation of international law. This foundation presently
remains visible, but perhaps more subtly in its applicability to law in
general.
4 Harold J. Berman, who held an endowed chair at Harvard Law
School, states, "The conventional concept of law as a body of rules
derived from statutes and court decisions-reflecting a theory of the
ultimate source of law in the will of the lawmaker ('the state')-is
wholly inadequate to support a study of a transnational legal culture."
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983).
9
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"transnational" would it be? 5
Stale legal thinking, stuck in a relativistic and
closed positivism,6 lags behind the renewal of scholarship
in philosophy and segments of the social sciences that
increasingly recognize the realities of justice,7 virtue,8 and
a higher standard, sometimes referred to as "higher 
law."9
The reputation of the legal profession and the quality of
legal systems hinge on the type of response elicited-
whether the legal world joins in the renewal found in other
' The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, wrote prodigiously on
higher law and justice vis-A-vis international law. See, e.g., HUGO
GROTiUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE
LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (Gwladys L. Williams & Walker H. Zeydel
trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (1604); HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE
RIGHTS OF WAR & PEACE (William Whewell, trans. Cambridge Univ.
Press 1853).
6 See, e.g., JOHN AusTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Robert
Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1985) (1885); JOHN AusTiN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DFTERMNED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1995) (1832); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed., MacMillian 1948) (1909); HANS
KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal.
Press 1967) (1923); HANS KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1946). Kelsen
and Austin are both deemed leading proponents of legal positivism.
Although not as easily recognized as such, Gray also qualifies as a type
of legal positivist of a different mold from Kelsen and Austin.
7 See ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 249-89 (Anthony
D'Amato ed., Anderson Publishing Co. 1996) (discussing justice);
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, ch. 7, 12 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1980) (same).
8 See e.g., PETER KREEFT, BACK TO VIRTUE (Ignatius Press 1992)
(bringing back classical understandings of virtue); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1984) (laying
out the limits of emotivism and discussing moral crisis); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (Univ. of Notre
Dame Press 1988) (critiquing the exclusion of virtue).
9 See EDWARD CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell Univ. Press 1928).
10
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disciplines, or whether it stays in fashionable or trendy ruts.
Principles of justice, higher law, and virtue form the
best foundation of any legal system and for the
practitioners therein. The need and desirability of such a
foundation are even more pronounced when it comes to the
international realm. These principles encompass the search
for the uniting, universal umbrellas built into the very
fabric of the universe, as well as the common ground of
humanity across cultures. Put another way, this article
proposes the unifying theory of jurisprudence, which I
contend provides the best basis for law and legal systems
worldwide. Anything less than this common denominator
would prove unfit as the groundwork for international legal
regimes, because member state cultures can vary
considerably.
Harold Koh, the current Dean of Yale Law School,
writes:
During the classical period of international
law, the causal question of why nations obey
was generally conflated with the normative
question of why they should obey, which
was in turn usually answered by "semi-
theological" reference to the "higher law"--
the "law of nature," of which international
law was but a part. Before the Roman
empire, religion served as the paramount
source of the law of nations. In Roman law,
Gaius defined jus gentium in terms of "law
common to all men." The Preface to
Justinian's Institutes, published in 533 A.D.,
began with observations about the
relationship between the law of nations and
natural law. . . . Nor did medieval legal
scholars distinguish municipal from
international law, instead viewing the law of
11
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nations, understood as jus naturae et
gentium, as a universal law binding upon all
mankind. The law of nations was
thought to embrace private as well as public,
domestic as well as transborder transactions,
and to encompass not simply the "law of
states," such as rules relating to passports
and ambassadors, but also the law between
states and individuals . . international and
domestic law together constituted a unified
legal system, with domestic institutions
acting as important interpreters and
enforcers of international legal norms.10
The pedigree of this perspective is extensive over
millennia, and still today, it provides a foundation for law
in general, and international law especially.
The Nazi Holocaust starkly demonstrates the need
for an international jurisprudence based upon higher law,
virtue, and justice. Atrocities were done "legally" at times
under German law and at the command of German
authorities.11 In order for one outside of German society,
10 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599,2604-05 (1997) (citations omitted).
'" The Hart-Fuller debate in the Harvard Law Review concerning the
jurisprudential implications of the case of the grudge informer places
the contrast between higher law and positivism in sharp relief. Lon F.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 648-57 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 90, 616-20 (1958).
This case concerns a woman in Nazi Germany, who, pursuant to the
Nazi Act of 1934, reported insulting remarks about Hitler made by her
husband as a pretext for getting rid of him. The husband received a
death sentence, which was commuted to a military assignment at the
front. Later, a West German court convicted her pursuant to the
German Criminal Code of 1871 for illegally depriving a person of his
freedom. Most notably, the court of appeals called the statute the
woman used as her pretext "contrary to the sound conscience and sense
12
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such as the Nuremberg Court, to decry these murders and
other abuses, there had to be some basis independent of
German positive 12 law. 13  There seems to be no better
grounding than higher law and justice. 14
Cicero, for example, advanced a higher law, virtue,
and justice position. Among many passages, Cicero wrote:
But if Justice is conformity to written laws
and national customs, and if, as the same
persons claim, everything is to be tested by
the standard of utility, then anyone who
thinks it will be profitable to him will, if he
is able, disregard and violate the laws. It
follows that Justice does not exist at all, if it
ofjustice of all decent human beings." Hart, supra note 11, at 619.
12 The Nazis used the positive pronouncements of Oliver Wendell
Holmes to justify the neutering of the mentally handicapped in
Germany. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("Three generations
of imbeciles are enough."). Given Holmes' positivism there exist few
resources in his jurisprudence to criticize such eugenic practices. See,
e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1918) (elucidating Holmes's positivism and rejecting natural law);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897) (same).
13 The Nuremberg Trials marked the first instance in history where
international war crimes were tried in a court. The Chief Prosecutor,
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, explicitly grounded the
prosecution in higher law.
14 If there does not exist an objective, just basis from which to say the
Holocaust was wrong, would it not be intensely problematic then to try
the Germans on an ex post facto basis in an unprecedented,
international tribunal? On what basis was there legitimate, actual
notice that the Germans who legally obeyed orders from legitimate
authorities to gas their victims were guilty of a crime if not that these
Germans also have the higher law and a sense of justice within them?
Conscience is a beacon of the higher law and justice, and every person
has a conscience. Granted, conscience can become dulled, seared,
tainted, or skewed, but it does exist in every human being, a classic
notion accepted by most of Western Civilization during the past two
millennia.
13
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does not exist in Nature, and if that form of
it which is based on utility can be
overthrown by that very utility itself. And if
Nature is not to be considered the
foundation of Justice, that will mean the
destruction [of the virtues on which human
society depends]. For where then will there
be a place for generosity. 15
Thus Cicero, widely hailed as the greatest legal mind of his
time, directly repudiates legal positivism and selfish
utilitarianism, and vouches for higher law, virtue, and
justice as the soundest basis for law, including international
law.
This article does not attempt to delineate and
demarcate all the contours of higher law, virtue, and justice
because such a task extends beyond its scope. It merely
seeks to establish the existence of higher law, virtue, and
justice so that those who have categorically excluded such
notions, especially those who have done so without much
thought, would at least have the opportunity to consider or
reconsider these notions.
Ironically enough, even those who categorically
exclude virtue, justice, and higher law typically hold to
them nonetheless in some way, shape, or form. For
example, the murder of innocent human beings is held to be
an injustice that violates higher law and virtue by
practically all people everywhere. This simple observation
reflects that we humans, of whatever society, bear the
imprint of a conscience, the faculty of perceiving the virtue,
justice, and higher law. 16
5 CERO, LAWS §§ I, XV, reprinted in THE GREAT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHERS 48 (Clarence Morris ed., Univ. of Penn. Press 1997).16 AS Berman writes:
[Tlhe underlying legal principles had not only a logical aspect,
14
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The jurisprudential view this article asserts does not
belong exclusively to any political party or government; it
remains the common inheritance of all humans everywhere.
It refuses to wear the Emperor's new clothes 17 particular to
every age and place.
Intentionally, I do not focus on applying the
foundation herein to any particular legal, political, or social
issue,1 8 except in passing or as a brief example, lest the
reader's position in one direction or another obfuscate the
desirability of this framework in general. Also, a
foundation does not form an entire edifice, and certain
portions of the edifice may directly touch on the foundation
more than others. Similarly, one can analyze where this
jurisprudential foundation touches more or less directly on
variegated aspects of the entire edifice of law.19 Such
being subject to reason, but also a moral aspect, being subject
to conscience. Therefore, not only an analytical or logical
systematization was required, which would strive for
consistency in the law, but also a moral systematization,
which would strive for equity . ... The logical, moral and
political aspects of basic legal principles were summarized in
the concept of natural law. This was a substantially different
concept for that held by the Greeks and the Romans. The
earlier natural law had been defined as the right of every
man-as it was put in the first title of Justinian's Digest-to
receive what was his due; natural law was justice, equity, what
was right; it was an ideal law, the law not of the state but of
nature itself, to which the law of the state might or might not
conform.
Berman, supra note 4 at 253-54.
" This refers to the well-known Hans Christian Anderson story of an
Emperor, who is cleverly persuaded that wearing only his
undergarments is in vogue.
's For such application to various issues and policies, see NATURAL
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY (David F. Forte ed.,
Georgetown Univ. Press 1998).
'9 For example, this paper would have more direct relevance to the
common law idea of malum in se, than malum prohibitum in criminal
15
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analysis, however, lies largely outside the scope of this
article.
Though higher law can be used as a pretext for
assorted forms of mischief, its abuse should not lead to a
denial of its existence. Indeed, these ideas of virtue,
justice, and higher law themselves would seek to bring a
corrective to such abuse. This article simply attempts to
show the existence and helpfulness of higher law, virtue,
and justice employed correctly, so that at least a few more
glimmers may emerge from its relative eclipse in both
modem and postmodern legal scholarship.2 °
A. Relevance
The most important and foundational relevance for
this framework is that it proposes the unifying, universal
foundation of jurisprudence, which itself is the proper
foundation for law. Such relevance is more striking in
international law,21 which cuts across national cultures. To
state it differently, not a single facet of law can live
completely independent of justice, virtue, and higher law
and still flourish in good health.22 The convocation of
law. Another example is the differing notions of viciousness, as
opposed to virtue, found in adjusting the requisite mens rea
proportionately with the punishment levels in criminal law. The
relegation of this example to a footnote perhaps helps accentuate the
idea that specific applications of this jurisprudential foundation would
fall to other writings besides this one.
20 See Peter Kreeft, Darkness at Noon: The Eclipse of Permanent
Things, July 1990, available at
www.ewtn.com/libraryiTEOLOGY/FR91102.HTM (last visited Jan.
18, 2006).
21 This relevance emerges time and again for this legal academic, who
has taught courses such as Public International Law, International
Organizations, and Human Rights.
22 For example, even a seemingly unrelated legal provision, such as
stop signs at a crowded intersection, still has virtuous and just goals-
as well as principles touching on higher law. Trying to prevent injury
16
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sources in this article primarily seeks to establish the
existence of justice, virtue, and higher law that can serve as
an efficacious filter and a perspicuous lens through which
to interpret, analyze, synthesize, and critique not only
transnational and international law, but also positive law as
a whole.
The widespread convergence of this recognition by
some of the most enduring thinkers from both the East and
the West, 23 which I trace below, gives tremendous
credibility to the common reality and truths that they
present. Taken as a group, they do not speak from the
same cultural, temporal, or professional prejudices, biases,
and patches of ignorance particular to any specific slice of
24society.
If such truth is immutable, how recently these
people acknowledged this reality is irrelevant. If anything,
the range of scholarship helps to assure us that they are not
speaking from the same cultural, temporal, and professional
prejudices, biases, provincialities, or patches of ignorance
particular to any specific group, including twenty-first
or death to innocent human beings would be one. The benefits of order
instead of chaos or anarchy constitute another. Fairness is implicated
in that the first to arrive has the right of way. Moreover, recklessly
rushing through a stop sign without stopping and causing an accident
would violate the virtue of prudence.
23 As an example, the work of Mencius, Mo Tzu, Plato, Aristotle, and
others will be discussed below.
24 It can broaden us beyond our particular time and place with its
myopic focus on the recent, while providing needed correctives.
Chronological, geographical, ethnic, or other types of snobbery or
narrowness have no place in the academy, jurisprudence, law, or
anywhere else for that matter. Therefore, what these classic Western
and Eastern sources say should not receive summary dismissal by
anyone. See C.S. Lewis, Introduction to ATHANASIUS, DE
INCARNATIONE (1945); see also C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN
(7th ed., Macmillan 1962), which some consider the best book of the
20th Century on this topic.
17
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25
century legal scholars.
The present legal academic world regularly
celebrates some of the dimensions of justice, virtue, and
higher law, even if these ideals sometimes fall under
different rubrics. After all, cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education,26 clearly did not follow the then existing line
of positive law or certain elements of the then current,
broader culture of its time. Yet, cases such as Brown are
widely celebrated today as a paragon of justice and higher
law-a case virtuously brought and justly decided. The
existence of transcultural justice, virtue, and higher law is
relevant everywhere and forms, where necessary, the basis
for legal reform.27
Similarly, we find massive corroboration in these
virtuoso thinkers and writers of sound, even outstanding,
intellect and sense of justice themselves. Therefore, these
classic Western and Eastern sources should not receive
deprecation, be ignored, or be dismissed. Indeed, the more
erudite one is, the more likely one will have a familiarity
with such major thinkers. This article mines from major
veins, although the Eastern sources are generally not well-
known or appreciated in the West.
Basic metaphysical questions not only are
addressed by, but also arise from, this article. 28 However,
merely a few questions among the many that may be raised
25 See LEWIS, supra note 24.
26 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
27 One need only look at whatever legal reform movement that one
champions in order to realize that a relativistic positivism (law as it
currently exists and finds enforcement by those with power) would
foreclose the possibility of reform. If one touts the notion of
"progress," such progress must be based upon some standard toward
which society is progressing. To the extent a society violated justice,
virtue, and higher law, it would regress proportionately.
28 Questions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics abound in this area
and cannot possibly receive comprehensive treatment in a single essay
of this length.
18
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will be singled out for treatment hereinafter to clear some
of the detritus that can obscure the view of justice, higher
law, and virtue-realities that impact all of mankind,
whether consciously or not.
B. Relevant Objections and Other Challenges
1. Epistemological Issues
The scientific method, including empirical
methodologies, has proven a fruitful and useful modus
operandi for many things. It can be used productively,
especially in the so-called natural sciences, but also to a
lesser extent in the so-called social sciences or humanities
including law. Some of the greatest gifts that the
Enlightenment and modernism periods have bequeathed
upon us derive from knowledge garnered through the sound
and rigorous application of these methods. An
epistemology that limits itself to scientific methodologies
alone, however, necessarily impoverishes itself and proves
impractical, unwittingly self-contradictory, or both.
As the leading philosopher, Arthur F. Holmes,
29
philosopher of science, Delvin Ratzsch, 30  and other
contemporary and historical sources point out, even so-
called "neutral" applications of scientific methodologies
necessarily predicate themselves on principles unprovable
solely by scientific methodologies. 31  Otherwise, it
becomes tautological, self-contradictory, or at best, begs
29 See, e.g., ARTHUR HOLMES, ETHICS (Inter-varsity Press 1984).
30 DELvIN RATZSCH, SCIENCE AND ITS LImiTS: THE NATURAL
SCIENCEs IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 101 (2d ed., Inter-varsity Press
2000).
31 For example, scientific assumptions unproveable by science include:
(a) that the senses, sometimes with instrumental aid, can access reality;
(b) that the human mind can then inductively ascertain truths from
what the senses apprehended; (c) that there exist knowable truths about
the reality of the physical world.
19
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the questions: why exalt scientific methodologies above all
others and why exclude other methodologies and
frameworks?
One may respond-because it works. But then,
why must pragmatic, practical, or utilitarian considerations
be deemed foundational? 32 Something may be pragmatic
yet brutal, practical but vicious, utilitarian yet unjust. For
example, it may be pragmatic for the purpose of retaining
power for a dictator to relegate conscientious dissidents
who are neither treasonous nor treacherous to heavy labor,
torture, and execution in concentration camps. Such
pragmatism collides directly with virtue, justice, and higher
law. At the same time, pragmatic or utilitarian
33
considerations, rationales, or justifications do not
necessarily a priori exclude all other methodologies and
frameworks.
Another may say-because it comports with reality
and facts. Herein lies a better response, but one that also
contains some untenable dichotomies such as the fact-value
split. Since knowledge, including the scientific kind,
should accord with truth, which conforms to reality,
scientific methods can provide valuable tools.
Yet, they are not the only tools that can access
objective reality. As a matter of fact, just and virtuous
realities are not best established by scientific
methodologies. Just as scientific methodologies function
through direct sensory or instrumental apprehension, the
work of a healthy conscience, 34 especially a well-cultivated
and developed one, can directly apprehend just and
32 CORWIN, supra note 8, at 4-5. These philosophies cannot justify
themselves by themselves; otherwise, they are reduced to tautologies.
33 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE UTIITARIANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRIN CIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Columbia Univ. Press
1946); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (2d ed., Hackett
Publishing 2001) (1863).
34 See J. BUDZisZEWSKI, THE REVENGE OF CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND
THE FALL OF MAN (Spence Publishing Co. 2004).
20
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virtuous realities comporting with higher law better than
the best scanning electron microscope. Excruciating
torture of a child for no other reason than the torturers'
sadism is readily apprehended as being unjust by those who
possess even a half-decent conscience. 35  It is possible,
however, for a conscience to be clouded, seared, calloused
or twisted, just as different physical pathologies can hinder
proper body function. The acknowledgment of conscience,
which can apprehend justice, higher law, and virtue, should
be no more impugned than the existence of DNA.
2. The Basis for This Basis
A healthy conscience is the standard by which one
judges normality in the moral sense. That is why ignorance
of the law is generally no excuse in Anglo-American
criminal law. In other words, the conscience engraved into
a person, regardless of whether the person has ever even
heard of the handiwork of the legislatures, judiciaries, or
executives, should prevent the occurrence of crime.
Various higher law theories, which are the mainstreams of
36 . 37the common law tradition, establish this point.
3' This counterexample refutes utilitarian calculus. To put it another
way, if you have a large enough crowd of sadists torturing an innocent
child, who derive massive amounts of pleasure that exceed the pain of
the lone child, then such behavior would be allowed under
utilitarianism because the total pleasure would outweigh the total pain.
That such an approach is morally reprehensible is readily apparent to
those with even a half-functioning conscience. Thus, such actions are
correctly deemed unconscionable, as violative of justice, virtue, and
higher law.
36 See ROBERT D. STACEY, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE AND THE
COMMON LAW: BLACKSTONE'S LEGACY TO AMERICA (ACW Press
1989). In Anglo-American history, Blackstone's writings constituted a
standard part of legal education. His works formerly graced the desks
of law offices throughout the United States and England.
36 The present McCormick Chair at Princeton, Robert George, writes
cogently from this school of thought in several works. See, e.g.,
21
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Some would claim that justice is simply defined
socially. Such a stance undermines individual
responsibility. 38  For a physician at Ravensbruck or
Auschwitz to refuse to perform crude experimentation on
an unwilling patient that severely injures and eventually
kills the innocent concentration camp prisoner would be to
exercise virtue in accordance with justice and higher law-
a law higher than Nazi dictates, no matter how legitimate or
exalted the government or military source within German
society. Nazi judges who refused to condemn innocent
people in spite of formalistic or positivistic pressures, such
as the Nuremberg Code, would be exercising virtue in
accordance with justice and higher law. If such virtue,
justice, and higher law did not exist, on what basis could
one critique, redress, or reform atrocities carried out during
the Holocaust, or in places such as the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, or East Timor?
39
This view necessarily undermines various forms of
ROBERT GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND
MORALITY IN CRISIS (ISI Books 2001); ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE
OF NATURAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); ROBERT GEORGE,
NATURAL LAW AND MORAL INQUIRY (Georgetown Univ. Press 1998).
37 See, e.g., Nuremberg Code, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/references/nurcode.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2006).
38 Long-time Harvard University Professor Lawrence Kohlberg deems
this level of moral development to be the highest of the six that he
proposes. See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Modes of
Moral Thinking & Choice in the Years 10 to 16 (December 1958)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago); LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1st ed., Harper & Row 1981).
'9 Other examples of international infamy along these lines include the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for which the U.N. established special
tribunals; East Timor, for which a separate country was recently
formed; and Colombia and Peru, which often have come under the
judgment of both the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, as
well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
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determinism, 40 whether biological, social, socio-biological,
or otherwise, which seek to eliminate the existence of
volition and responsibility.4 1  Such determinisms
presumably attract their adherents by eradicating
culpability, a convenient, but incorrect way to deal with
guilt and shame. It should be noted that removing
culpability negates responsibility, which pushes society
towards anarchy, anomie,
42  and antinomianism, 43
conditions that adherence to virtue, justice, and higher law
prevent.
A common, albeit irresponsible, escape attempt is
an agnostic skepticism, which is a position in and of itself.
If seeking logical consistency, why not be skeptical or
agnostic about skepticism and agnosticism? 44
Another error lies in embracing contradictory,
relativistic pluralism.4 5  While recognizing that common
40 For a discussion of this point, see the philosophy of science works of
Oxford Professor Alister McGrath, who holds a Ph.D. in microbiology,
available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-mcgrath/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
4' FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NoTEs FROM UNDERGROUND (Mirra
Ginsburg trans., Bantam Books 1974). Dostoevsky satirizes
rationalistic, empirical determinism extensively.
42 The term is used particularly in the sociological sense as employed
by scholars such as Emile Durkheim.
43 A term indicating lawlessness-not a condition favorable to the
existence of legal systems, institutions, or legal professionals to say the
least.
44 No one could function with a thoroughgoing skepticism or
agnosticism. If I did not firmly believe in the existence of this
computer on which I am typing this article or in the law journal
member who will read it, I would not be typing it right now. If I did
not believe in the existence of the chair I am sitting in, I would not
attempt to sit in it for the many hours I have in preparing this article.
Even functionally, thoroughgoing skepticism and agnosticism fail. I
am skeptical of the soundness of skepticism, yet not agnostic about
existing pitfalls in agnosticism. Most honest and sensible people could
not correctly claim to hold a thoroughgoing skepticism or agnosticism;
those who do, paralyze themselves.
45 See LESsLIE NEwBIGIN, TRUTH TO TELL: THE GOSPEL AND PUBLIC
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ground often exists between various worldviews, this view
plainly violates the law of noncontradiction when particular
worldviews adhere to mutually exclusive positions. Either
an objective standard of justice exists, or an objective
standard of justice does not exist. Both statements cannot
be true and concomitantly comport with reality.
This does not impugn true paradoxes or antinomies,
which only seem to contradict, but in reality do not.
46
Rather, I am talking about clear-cut A and not A instances
which cannot both be true and also correspond with reality,
according to this basic axiom of logic, philosophy, and
mathematics. To give another example, a person cannot
both have biological children and not have biological
children at the same time in any unified, literal sense. To
say otherwise would fly in the face of common sense.
As a leading Hindu philosopher acknowledged,
epistemological arms that embrace all views lead to self-
strangulation. As stated by G.K. Chesterton, the open
mind, like the open mouth, is intended to close down upon
something.47 That something includes the truths of justice,
virtue, and higher law that accord with the highest design
48of human nature. This position is cohesive and comports
TRUTH (W.B. Eerdmans 1991) (providing a sound treatment of
pluralism).
46 For example, I do not presently deny such paradoxes as the wave or
particle duality of light, the way certain sub-atomic particles seem to
behave, elements of both genders existing in hermaphrodites, the
Trinity, or all three states of H20 (water vapor, liquid water, and solid
ice) existing at the triple point.
47 This epigram comes from the British author G.K. Chesterton. See,
e.g., G.K. CHESTERTON, ALL IS GRIST: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (Books for
Libraries Press 1931); G.K. CHESTERTON, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(Sheet & Ward 1956); G.K. CHESTERTON, As I WAS SAYING (Books for
Libraries Press 1966).
48 See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
Nov. 22, 1969, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/-
basic2.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) (basing its pronouncements on
this premise).
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with objective reality.
3. Lesser Alternatives
Historically, it was recognized that the common law
permits the correction of errors. 49  Formalistic or
positivistic cowardice should not prevent those with
authority to modify positive law from abandoning unjust
ruts. 50 Thus, we should not believe that human lawmakers,
adjudicators, or executors are so constrained to maintain
unjust laws-unless they unduly bind themselves with
formalist or positivistic shackles. 51  Nothing contained
herein, however, should be construed as necessarily
violative of constitutional order, as far as the allocation and
separation of powers are concerned. Nor should it be
employed as a pretext for judicial usurpation of legislative
or executive power-or any other usurpation of authority.
49 See JEFFREY A. BRAUiCH, Is HIGHER LAW COMMON LAW? READINGS
ON THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
(F.B. Rothman 1999).
'0 See ANTHONY D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE &
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW (Brill Academic Publishers 1984).
5' The doctrine of stare decisis or custom, as convenient and helpful as
it may be as an approach to procedure and order, should not be exalted
over justice. The common law does not advocate such a stance, and
international law should not embrace it. Yet, such a stance is not rare
de facto. Instead, virtue, justice, and higher law should reign above
slavish devotion to stare decisis or custom. See Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision."); see also Thomas Healy,
Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43,
87 (2001) ("The American commitment to stare decisis gradually
strengthened during the nineteenth century, due mainly to the
emergence of reliable law reports and a positivist conception of law.").
Contra id. at 71 ("Precedent, though it be Evidence of law, is not Law
itself, much less the whole of the Law."). Eschewing an overly rigid
application of stare decisis allows the overturning of cases such as
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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In other words, it accords, rather than clashes with, respect
for duly constituted authority including the legislative
powers of Congress. 
52
Rabelais satirizes formalist insufficiencies in
Gargantua & Pantagruel.53 In this satire, the judge has an
elaborate array of formalities and procedures, but in the end
decides to make a random decision. This satire implies that
procedural integrity ipso facto is not enough to ensure
substantive justice.
Rather, substantive justice, as the dominant goal,
should be served by fair procedures. 54 Harold J. Berman
notes:
52 Berman writes of an approach that "should bring the three traditional
schools of jurisprudence - the political school (positivism), the moral
school (natural-law theory), and the historical school (historical
jurisprudence) - together in an integrative jurisprudence." Berman
supra note 4, at 44. Such an approach acknowledges the descriptive,
structural, and social order roles of positivism, the prescriptive function
of higher law, and the benefit of historical study to bring correctives to
bear as well as expose blind spots and provincialities of this time and
place. The more these three schools of thought can be harmonized,
applied, and integrated in a way that reflects the strength of each, the
better.
53 RABELAIs, GARGANTUA & PANTAGRUEL (Jacque Le Clerq trans.,
Random House 1963).
First I view and review, read and re-read, ponder, weigh,
thumb and digest the bills of complaint, subpoenas,
appearances by proxy, reports of hearings, investigations,
instruments of deposition, petitions, articles of evidence,
allegations, rejoinders, rebuttals, requests, inquests,
surrejoinders, surrebuttals, confirmation of former testimony,
acts, writs, bulls, exceptions taken, grievances, objections,
counter-objections . . . I decided in favor of the party who
won at the judiciary, tribonian and praetorial throw of the
dice.
Id. at 440-41.
5 Attorneys and judges sometimes look for procedural pretexts to
advance substantive concerns.
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The system of procedure was said to be
designed "to inform the conscience of the
judge"-a phrase later used in the equitable
procedure of the English chancery...
Indeed, the principles of reason and
conscience were proclaimed by the
ecclesiastical jurists as weapons against the
formalism and magic of Germanic law. 55
The fictional Justice Keen is a prototypical
positivist, who can excel in the description of the particular
law in a given society. 56  Positivism also does well to
acknowledge and give due deference to the formulations of
legitimate authority, a primary position that the higher law
acknowledges, yet does not treat as an absolute guide to
substantive justice. On the negative side, however,
positivism often adopts a false dichotomy between facts
and values. 57 According to this position, facts are public
and objective while values are only private and presumably
subjective. 58 If higher law and justice do in fact exist, why
should they find themselves relegated to private life
alone? 59 Such a view leads to hypocrisy, undermining the
integrity of the unitary, whole person in society.
60
55 Berman, supra note 4, at 251.
56 Lon Fuller, Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616




59 See NEWBIGIN, supra note 46, at 63.
60 See VIRTuEs: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON MORAL CHARACTER
(Robert B. Kruschwitz & Robert C. Roberts eds., 1987). It
impoverishes public life and leads to the double lives of those who put
on the fagade of a public persona that masks an execrable life outside
the public eye. Those in the legal or political realm cannot excuse
themselves from this in saying that though they consider something an
injustice as a "private citizen," they must mechanically maintain the
27
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The question stares us in the face-do international
law and other law have their basis in higher law and
justice? Or is it nothing more than a product of the politics
of professionals, politicians, diplomats, and other power
brokers, who may or may not have a firm, objective basis,
and who alone have sovereignty to decide the norms and
structures of society?
61
If no justice or higher law exists, then every reform
and every critique would fall into the morass of merely
subjective opinion. If all that exists is each person's
subjective opinion, then no grounds from which one could
say that one opinion is better than another exist. If not,
then on what permanent foundation would law stand or
toward what would it progress? If one removes the
cleansing cascade of higher law, virtue, and justice, then a
raw, cynical calculus of so-called Realpolitik would remain
like a crusted stain.
If objective bases in higher law and justice do not
exist, then ideological and Weltanschauung62  chaos,
conflict, and confusion follow. Epistemic despondence and
narrowness then tend to rear their ugly heads. Rather than
having no better grounds than the instability of relativism
or uneasy, but logically incompatible pluralism, many
authors aver a justice, virtue, and higher law foundation for
present law in their public capacities when it is manifestly unjust albeit
politically inexpedient for their own self-interested considerations.
While failure is common, it should not deny the goal of a virtuously
integrated person, virtuous, including just, and moral in private as well
as public life. Legislators, legal practitioners, judges, and other
professionals often have public dimensions to their lives that should be
no less moral or virtuous than their private lives. This applies to the
domestic realms and international spheres, as well as the interactions
between the domestic and international systems.
61 See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRiNCE AND OTHER WRrINGS (Wayne
Rebhom trans., Barnes and Noble Classics 2003); Alexander Obolsky,
Law & Psychiatry Lecture at Northwestern University School of Law
(Fall 1999).
62 This is the German term for worldview.
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the super-structures of law. This convergence and
confluence of great scholars bears witness to the fact that
virtue, justice, and higher law do, in fact, exist
independently of the vagaries of any mortal individual or
group. 63 They serve as the best basis for law, especially
international law.
When this reality is ignored and a society allows
oppressive laws to reign, the results can be nothing short of
catastrophic. Nazi Germany, Maoist China, and Stalinist
Russia are but three twentieth century examples of
totalitarian regimes that abused law and used it as a weapon
for oppression and repression.64 Mass executions, gulags,
cruel human experimentation, and concentration camps
resulted. 65
As a positive contrast, by way of contemporary
introduction and treatment, it is fitting to include one
shining example of courageous communication of these
unpopular, yet no less just, realities: Nobel Laureate
Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn. Few, if any, people in
the twentieth century had more effectively borne eloquent
witness to higher law, virtue, and justice in reference to
such horrendous regimes, especially the brutal oppression
that Solzhenitsyn himself suffered. His writings and
addresses give hope that the truth of sound virtue, justice,
63 Various passages in Sophocle's Antigone bring this point out
lyrically. See SOPHOCLES, THE OEDIPUS PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES (Paul
Roche trans., Mentor 1958) [hereinafter OEDIPUS PLAYS].
64 RANDALL L. BYTWERK, BENDING SPINES: THE PROPAGANDAS OF
NAzI GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (Michigan
State Univ. Press 2004); RHOADS MURPHEY, HISTORY OF ASIA 351-54,
379-82 (Addison-Wesley 1992).
65 While this response does not purport to provide a historical survey of
the practices of such regimes, even a cursory scan would reveal that
many such historical treatments have well-documented the inhumane
and barbarous acts done in the name of law, or at least with the
permission of, including improper application or enforcement of decent
laws that were violated. The primary documents in the Nuremberg
trials are a case in point.
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and higher law can and will triumph over miswielded
force. 66In this way, Solzhenitsyn addresses the larger
questions of law with its best metaphysical moorings. For
these attainments, he has been heralded widely as a great
voice in an ethical and legal wilderness.
These questions are often ignored to our peril. The
accumulated experience and wise interpretation of history
make it not too sweeping a statement to claim that all
people in all places and times, contrary to socialized or
other ethical relativisms, must heed justice, virtue, and
higher law in order to thrive, whether in domestic or
international spheres.
As one acknowledges such ethical virtuosos as
Solzhenitsyn in our time, one can also remove oneself from
chronological snobbery and geographic provincialism in
order to stand on the broad shoulders of giants from both
the East and the West. Mencius, Mo Tzu, Plato, and
Aristotle allow one to see further and more clearly than the
constraints of ethical relativism or legal positivism or
formalism would allow. 67 A truly international
jurisprudence should be founded on that which is common
to the East and the West for all time. The fixation with the
recent and contemporary must make room for the wisdom
of the ages, which does not change with the shifting sands
66 As a singular contrast in the midst of the Soviet oppression, Nobel
Laureate Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn powerfully conveys the
ideals of higher law. From his bombshell Commencement Address at
Harvard University in 1978 to the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University, from the Gulag Archipelago to The Oak and the Calf
Solzhenitsyn stunningly asseverates higher law. See, e.g., Aleksandr
Isayevich Solzhenitsn, Address at Harvard University (1978);
ALEKsANDR ISAYEviCH SOLZHENrTSN, THE OAK AND THE CALF (Harry
Willetts trans., Harper & Row 1980); ALEKsANDR ISAYEVICH
SoLzHENrrSN, GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1st ed. 1985).
67 To borrow and modify a modest disclaimer by Sir Isaac Newton, "If
I have seen further, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of
giants." Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676).
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of time. 
68
Helping to dig a truly transnational and
international jurisprudential foundation toward a more
widespread recognition of the existence of objective
justice, virtue, and higher law is an important foundation to
consider before asking questions about any particular legal
system, international and domestic alike. These first
sections have introduced this topic, demonstrated its
relevance, and addressed objections that exist to justice,
virtue, and higher law as a jurisprudential basis. This
treatment now extends to a constructive case with a view
from the East, in conjunction with classical sources from
the West.
I. A View From the East
Classical Eastern philosophers, often ignored or
given scant treatment in the West, have much to teach us
about the necessity of adhering to justice and higher law in
order for law and the polis to flourish, domestically or
internationally. They write much of virtue, which merges
with broader notions of justice-indeed justice itself is a
classic, linchpin virtue. Virtue also always comports with
the higher law. In order to regain a more adequate
adherence to virtue, justice, and higher law, most notably
for transnational or international law, one must delve into
the relevant portions of Eastern philosophies.
Around 1122 BC, the Chou Empire conquered the
Shang people. Instructions issued by a Chou ruler to one of
his vassals said, "I will explain to you how virtue should
control the use of punishments .... Make your judgments
68 If international law and other law do not more fully regain their
moorings in just reality, virtue, and higher law, then we will reap much
bitter fruit in the future of the world. Much positive law begging for
conscientious objections may then increase.
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justly and sincerely." 69 Even a ruler of these marauding
conquerors not only referred to, but also exhorted, the
exercise of just judgments. Such just judgments surely rise
above the arbitrary and capricious, the inconsistent and
unfair. Thus, justice grounded in the higher law is a prized
virtue.
Mo Tzu, who was primarily raised on
Confucianism, started his own school of thought,
comparable to classical Confucianism. About the need for
the just administration of law and order, he articulated a
theory applicable to both the international and domestic
arenas. Tzu writes:
Now all the rulers desire their provinces to
be wealthy, their people to be numerous, and
their jurisdiction to secure order. But what
they obtain is not wealth but poverty, not
multitude but scarcity, not order but chaos-
this is to lose what they desire and obtain
what they abhor. Why is this?
This is because the rulers have failed to
exalt the virtuous and to employ the capable
in their governments. When the virtuous
officers become numerous in a state, order
will be stable. Therefore the task of the
lords lies no where but in multiplying the
virtuous. But what is the way to multiply
the virtuous?
Suppose, for example, that one wishes to
cause good archers and charioteers to be
numerous. In this case one will certainly
enrich them, give them rank, respect them,
and laud them. Once these things are done,
6 9 THE SHE KING 396-97 (James Legge trans., Trubner & Co. 1875).
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good archers and charioteers will become
numerous. How much more should this be
done in the case of the virtuous and
excellent who are rich in virtuous conduct,
versed in argumentation, and experienced in
the arts of the Way? These are certainly the
treasures of the nation and the supports of
the state. They too must be enriched, given
rank, respected, and lauded; once this is
70done, they too will be numerous.
The passage quoted above outlines both the wisdom and
method of instilling virtue, of which justice is a central one,
and installing virtuous leaders. 7 1 Both results bring greater
justice to a society and encourage greater adherence to
higher law. Such objectives rise higher than a
behaviorism 72 unattached to magnanimous ends, such as
advancing the common good.
Mo Tzu apparently agreed with Confucius that the
hereditary rulers should transfer the administration of their
governments to men of virtue and capacity.73 At its best, it
should not be reduced into a purely pragmatic, behaviorist,
or utilitarian calculus-although it can appear that way on
its face and can reduce to such calculi in its crasser forms.
70 MOTSE, THE ETHICAL AND POLmCAL WORKS OF MOTSE 30-31 (Mei
Yi-Pao trans., Probsthian 1929).
71 See Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., Somoza's Revenge: A New Judge for the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. L.J., 137 n.4
(1992) (discussing the debate surrounding the moral qualification for a
justice on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
7 2 See IvAN PAvLOv, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(Philosophy Library 1957); B.F. SKINNER, CONTINGENCIES OF
REINFORCEMENT: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (Appleton-Century-
Crafts 1969).
73 MOTSE, supra note 71, at 19.
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A. Mencius
In the midst of a high-water mark for the popularity
of Mo Tzu's way of thinking, the so-called "agricultural
school" of Mencius emerged.74 It maintained that "a wise
and virtuous ruler tills the soil together with his people in
order to get his food; along with governing, he cooks his
own meals morning and night.",75 Underlying this notion is
the principle that those who rule and judge should know the
life of the people they rule or judge.
Apparently, Mencius followed the example of
Confucius in a number of ways.76  Mencius eloquently
asserted the claim of the scholar and the man of virtue to a
place of honor above that which is conferred by the pomp
of princes. Such a man, as expressed by Mencius, should
regard worldly success and failure with indifference, secure
in the knowledge that, if his character is as it should be and
the world fails to acclaim him, the fault lies not with
himself but with the world. 77 That is the sort of virtue that
is worthy of notice, and refreshing in an age of hype and
celebrity production. Describing the just and virtuously
great person, Mencius says:
74 Mencius' opinion foreshadows and antedates by millennia the views
of this nation's founders such as George Washington, who tilled the
soil himself at Mount Vernon, and Thomas Jefferson, who had greater
trust in the hard-working, ordinary agrarian than some of his oligarchic
contemporaries.
71 THE FOUR BOOKS, 3 (2) 10 (James Legge trans., Commercial Press
1966).
76 For example, he was as democratic as Confucius in accepting
students regardless of their socioeconomic or political standing,
demonstrating an unusually egalitarian educational ethic. THE FOUR
BoOKS, supra note 76, at 19.
77ld. at (1) 9.
34
2:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 35
Dwelling in the wide house of the world,
occupying his correct place in the world,
walking in the great way of the world; when
his desire for office is fulfilled, practicing
his principles along with others; when that
desire is disappointed, practicing them
alone; riches and honors cannot corrupt him,
poverty and mean condition cannot change
him, authority and power cannot make him
bend the knee: such is the truly great man.
78
Earlier, Confucius told the rulers to transfer the
administration of their governments to men of virtue,
ability, and education, 7 9 which Mencius fully concurs with
as the previous quote partially describes.
"One who outrages the human virtues is called a
brigand; one who transgresses against righteousness is
called a ruffian. I have heard that the fellow called Chou
was put to death, but I have not heard that this was killing a
sovereign." 80 In regards to the regicide of the last Shang
ruler, Menicus stated this when asked about it by the King
of Ch'i. Evidently, Mencius then placed just and virtuous
character above brute power or position, even the position
of king. For Mencius, might does not equal right, nor does
positional authority by itself necessarily denote the exercise
of justice. Hence, the basic postulate of Mencius'
sociopolitical and legal program asserted that virtues such
as justice, above all else, breed success in the most
78 Id. at 3 (2) 2.3. As we shall see later in this study, similar notions
also occurred in prominent Western thinkers. We need many more
such great and just people, who not only reflect higher law in their
jurisprudence, but also in their very lives.
'9 See CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (David Hinton trans., Counterpoint
1998); CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (Raymond Dawson trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1993).
'0 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 1 (2) 8.
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profound sense of the word. 81
Mencius directly counters a representation of one of
Mo Tzu's principal arguments on its face, namely that the
necessity of something's utility or profitableness as
bedrock. This argument could also be said to counter
Western utilitarian arguments advanced by scholars such as
John Stuart Mill82 and Jeremy Bentham, 83 who rehash
some of the same hackneyed utilitarianism much later in
another part of the world.
The following passage also emphasizes the
necessity of going beyond the narrowness of short-term,
shortsighted personal utility and profitability. The book of
Mencius begins:
Mencius went to see King Hwuy of Leang.
The king said, "Venerable sir, since you
have not counted it far to come here, a
distance of a thousand li, I presume that you
are likewise provided with counsels to profit
my kingdom?" Mencius replied, "Why
must Your Majesty use the word 'profit'?
What I am 'likewise provided with, are
counsels to benevolence and righteousness,
and these are my only topics. If Your
Majesty say, 'What is to be done to profit
my kingdom?' the great officers will say,
'What is to be done to profit our families?'
and the inferior officers and the common
people will say, 'What is to be done to profit
our persons?' Superiors and inferiors will
81 The point here is not an advocacy of regicide or other killing of a
judge or sovereign. Rather, it dramatically underscores the importance
ofjustice and virtue in any legal and political system.
82 MuLL, supra note 33.
83 BENTHAK, supra note 33.
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try to snatch this profit the one from the
other, and the kingdom will be
endangered.
' 84
Clearly, a simplistic profit-seeking and utilitarian
perspective fails to reach that just and virtuous height that
Mencius advocates. Those who advance justice and higher
law typically do not obsess about profit-and may indeed
sacrifice in various ways for higher causes. 
85
Continuing this argument, Mencius points out that
such a condition will put the king in the precarious position
of losing his life to a subordinate who covets his position
and his wealth. He continues:
There never has been a man trained to
benevolence who neglected his parents.
There has never been a man trained to
righteousness who made his sovereign an
after consideration. Let Your Majesty also
say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and
these shall be the only themes.' Why must
you use that word-'profit'?
86
Such a stance undermines reductionistic "bottom line"
pursuits of profit to the exclusion of virtue, an approach
unworthy of the more exalted calling of justice and higher
law.
Similar to Confucius's and Aristotle's contentions,
Mencius claimed that the good is that which is most fully
congruent with human nature. 87  But, the Legalists of
" THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 429-31.
85 For example, surveys demonstrate that public interest attorneys make
the least income, yet have the highest satisfaction in their work of any
segment of the legal profession. They often make greater impacts for
justice too.86 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 432.
8 7 id.
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China would contend that Mencius had an unduly
optimistic view of human nature. 88 All of them, however,
agreed with the necessity of actions in accordance with
sound justice and other virtues, and the necessity of higher
law beyond brute force or sheer authority alone.
Returning to Mencius, he vouched for "education"
chiefly as a means to cultivate a good sense of justice in
accordance with original human nature. 89  He observes,
"That which differentiates men from the birds and beasts is




A basic principle of Taoism is that one should be in
harmony with, not in rebellion against, the foundational
laws of the universe. 91  Such a tenet presupposes the
existence of foundational laws of the universe-in other
words, higher law. 92
According to contemplative Taoism, living in
accordance with the fundamental laws of the universe
includes maintaining insouciance towards power, position,
or honors in this world.93 Taoist works speak of various
sages who declined the offices of prime ministers and did
88 id.
89 The argument that education cultivates justice is similar to Platonic
"memory" or analogous to a pre-fall state of Edenic innocence in the
Judeo-Christian view. See Genesis 1:1-3:24.
90 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 14 (2) 19.1. Mencius' position
implicitly endorses the proposition that one must always act justly and
virtuously because everything one does will impact, for good or ill, the
development of one's own character. That statement would necessarily
include everything that one does within the legal profession.
91 Id.
92 U.S. legal scholars in the present period of history certainly do not
hold such an assumption universally, which accentuates the need for its
rediscovery.
93 THE FOURBOOKS, supra note 76, at 14 (2) 19.1.
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not seize the offer of thrones. 94  Thus, a Taoist living
according to these ideals would live above the vainglory,
conceit, and arrogance that often accompany rulership in
this life.
The Taoist position is more susceptible to the
critique of erring too far towards a phlegmatic, even at
times irresponsible, indifference to such matters. For
example, it also fails to provide a sufficient notion of
resource stewardship in its flight away from materialism,
greed, and selfish ambition. If taken too far, Taosim almost
crowns apathy as a virtue. It would be no virtue, for
example, to be apathetic or phlegmatic to international
human rights violations that should be upheld worldwide.
Nonetheless, Taoism still adheres to a form of higher law.
C. Hsuntze
The philosopher Hsuntze also notes the self-
interested proclivities of humans that Taoism apparently
attempts to remedy. 95 Hsuntze's views contrast with the
Taoists in what he considers "natural." While a Taoist
considers becoming "natural" as the crux of the answer,
Hsuntze sees our "natural" condition as problematic from
birth. 96 He says:
The original nature of man to-day is to seek
for gain. If this desire is followed, strife and
rapacity results, and courtesy dies. Man
originally is envious and naturally hates
others . . . Therefore to give rein to man's
original nature, to follow man's feelings,
inevitably results in strife and rapacity,
94 id
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together with violations of etiquette and
confusion in the proper way of doing things,
and reverts to a state of violence. Therefore
the civilizing influence of teachers and laws,
the guidance of the rules of proper conduct
(Li) and justice (Yi) is absolutely necessary.
. . By this line of reasoning it is evident that
the nature of man is evil and his goodness is
acquired.
97
This view not only serves as a counter point to the
views of Mencius, but it also impinges upon other
perspectives. What some thinkers consider the motivating
forces (e.g., a la Adam Smith 98 and other capitalists),
others (e.g., Karl Marx and Mao Tse-Tung) see as
problems with capitalistic systems. These systems,
Hsuntze would likely say, beg for virtues of temperance,
justice, and content generosity through the fostering of
character, education, and laws consonant with the higher
law. Legal systems ideally work as safeguards against the
self-interested tendencies of humanity.
To give another example, an extended but selective
quote from Hsuntze elaborates on key elements of his
vision of justice, especially in regard to virtuous
contentment (not to be confused with a smug complacence)
contrasted with disgruntled greed. The level of justice,
virtue, and accordance with higher law would increase with
its application. It contrasts moral laxness with morality,
materialism with satisfaction, anxiety with peace, and
anhedonia with virtuous pleasure and happiness. It would
accord well with Aristotle's notions of arete and
eudaimoniam, which translate to virtue and happiness.
Hsuntze writes:
97ld. at 301.
98 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 10 (C.J. Bullock ed.,
P.F. Collier & Son 1909).
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[T]here is no one who in their purpose
despises moral principles, who does not
value material things; and that there is no
one who does not externally value material
things and is not inwardly anxious; and that
there is no one whose actions deviate from
moral principles who is not in dangerous
circumstances; and that there is no one who
is in dangerous circumstances who is not
inwardly fearful. When the mind is anxious
and fearful, though the mouth be holding
meat, it will not recognize the flavour
thereof; though the ears hear bells and
drums, they will not recognize the sound
thereof... though the clothes be light and
warm, and he be sitting on a rush or fine
bamboo mat, the body will not recognize the
comfort thereof; for he may enjoy the
goodness of all things, yet he cannot be
contented. If he gains a respite and
contentment, his anxiety and fear
nevertheless do not leave him. For though
he be enjoying the goodness of all things,
yet he is greatly anxious; though he be
absorbing the benefit of all things, yet he
gains great injury... Although this sort of
man be made a marquis and called a prince,
he would be no whit different from a
common man or a robber; although he were
to ride in a nobleman's coach or wear a
crown, he would be no whit different from a
footless cripple. Then he could well be
called one who makes himself the servant of
material things. If the heart is tranquil and
contented, though the colours be below the
41
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ordinary, they can nourish the eyes; though
sounds be below the ordinary, they can
nourish the ears; coarse food and vegetable
soup can nourish the taste; coarse cotton
clothes and coarse hemp sandals can nourish
the body; a straw hut for a house, reed
screens for doors, straw beds, ancient plain
stands and mats can nourish the form. For a
person may be without the goodness of all
things, yet he can foster his enjoyment; he
may be without a position of high rank, but
he can foster his fame. If such a man were
given the empire, it would mean much for
the empire, but it would mean little for his
contentment and joy. Thus he could be
called one who makes his personality
important and makes material things his
servants. 
99
Such a passage can serve a salubrious purpose if more
faithfully applied by those responsible for legal systems.
Indeed, Hsuntze's description may also be a virtuous
prescription that falls within higher law and justice for
societies and individuals everywhere.
D. Neo-Confucianists From Chu Hsi
We now move to one of the greatest, if not the
greatest, of the Neo-Confucianists, Chu Hsi. His
interpretations of some of the classics were considered
authoritative on the official Chinese government exams for
almost six centuries, specifically from 1313 until 1905
when the government abrogated the exams. Addressing the
structure of justice and higher law built into the universe,
Chu Hsi avers that "[p]rinciples or 1i... are without birth
99 XUNZI, supra note 96, at 298-99.
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and indestructible." 100 Changeless, they are all part of the
one great li, the Supreme Ultimate, which Chu Hsi equates
at times with the Tao. He recognized that principles of
justice and higher law are both equally applicable in the
Western Hemisphere as they have been in the East.
In reference to Mencius, another leading Neo-
Confucianist, Tai Chen states, "The ancients who wished to
illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first
ordered well their own states ... they first cultivated their
persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first
rectified their hearts." 10 1 Chen helped revive the centrality
of character development through virtue, a result that flows
from the pursuit of justice and higher law.
Chen reinforces these notions by recognizing the
place of "virtues as the sense of shame, humility, and the
knowledge of right and wrong."' 10 2 Chen combines both
emotivist and intellectual-cognitive dimensions in his
conception of virtue. A reduction of virtue to either a
emotivist or an intellectual-cognitive dimension alone,
however, misses the mark. Chen was not a moral skeptic,
but is often mired in the morass of doubt and despair in
regards to the epistemology of ethics.
Perhaps his witnessing actual failures of justice,
higher law, and virtue helps explain why Yen Fu, who
studied at the University of Edinburgh and translated
Western philosophical works into Chinese, brought a
scathing indictment after the first World War. Yen Fu
wrote, "It seems to me that in three centuries of progress
the people of the West have achieved four principles: to be
selfish, to kill others, to have little integrity, and to feel
little shame."'103 From one who had formerly admired
100 H.G. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAO TsE-
TUNG 207 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1953).
101 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 310-12.
102 CREEL, supra note 101, at 228-29.
103 YEN FU, HsUEH HENG, No. 18 6-7 (1923).
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Western culture, Yen Fu's words are sobering ones indeed.
The four "principles" Fu describes certainly would not lead
to a harmonious international or domestic legal system.
This survey identifies an Eastern pattern that
recognizes the existence of justice, virtue, and higher law
and points to various aspects of these principles-whether
indicated in "right living," Li, morality, Tao, or other
comparable terms. This reality, whichever appellation one
chooses to give it, forms the best foundation for law,
especially international law, which must carve out the
common inheritance of humanity in the midst of diverse
cultures.
I. The Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle on Justice,
Higher Law and Virtue
Turning now from Asia to ancient Greece, let us
inquire into the Pre-Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian
conceptions of justice, virtue, and higher law which are
necessary to maintain the health of jurisprudence and the
law.
A. Pre-Socratics
The Pre-Socratics stress their continuity with the
past through the idea of a law-governed universe. 14 They
explain that the ordered processes of nature relate to the
growing ethical conviction, entrenched in their cultural
heritage, that just principles are rooted in reality. 105 This
emphasis has no part in the presumption that nature is
value-free.I°6 Modem meta-ethics, by contrast, puts on a
104 See Gregory Vlastos, Equality and Justice in Early Greek
Cosmologies, 42 CLAssICAL PHIL. 156-78 (1947).
105 See TERENCE IRWIN, CLASSICAL THOUGHT (Oxford Univ. Press
1989).
106See id.; WERNER JAEGER, PAIDELA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE
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fagade of just discourse while denying the very existence of
a higher law.
An example of a law-governed universe from Pre-
Socratic literature is found in Aeschylus's Oresteia.
Orestes becomes aware of a more rational justice than cruel
vindictiveness, a rule of law that seeks to virtuously
superintend, rather than further inflame, conflicting
interests. In this conception, the rule of reason overcomes
blind fate. This movement towards a more virtuous
conception of higher law and an eternal, celestial court
gives hope for eventual justice in spite of present injustices.
Sophocles puts the following words in heroine
Antigone's mouth, which appeal to a higher law than the
king's orders. In response to the inquiry of whether she
flatly chose to disobey, she exclaims:
Naturally! Since Zeus never promulgated
Such a law. Nor will you find
That Justice publishes such laws to man
below.
I never thought your edicts had such force
They nullified the laws of heaven, which,
Unwritten, not proclaimed, can boast
A currency that everlastingly is valid;
An origin beyond the birth of man.
And I, whom no man's frown can frighten,
Am far from risking Heaven's favor by
flouting these. 107
This lyrical expression of the higher, heavenly law speaks
to its pre-historic origin, its eternal applicability, and its
binding position of ascendancy over even king-made
positive law in a monarchy.
Along similar lines, Heraclitus wrote that human
(Oxford Univ. Press 1939).10 7OEDIPUS PLAYS, supra note 64, at 179.
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laws are nourished by one divine law that outlasts them
all-the higher law. 108 Heraclitus seeks an enlargement of
the rule of law beyond the city-state into a form of cosmic
justice. 109 Heraclitus also discussses a harmony of
opposites grounded in natural law, called Logos, which are
somewhat similar to the concept of yin and yang in some
Asian philosophies.ll0 At times, Heraclitus actually seems
to identify Logos with the divine. A kind of cosmic justice,
so to say, is thus rooted in the Logos reality.'11 This truth
is foundational to an international jurisprudence especially,
but also to domestic ones.
The Sophists, on the other hand, put forth a position
widely held today-rhetoric shapes the appearance, which
is what is perceived and which has no grounding in justice,
virtue, or higher law. Such a stance can lead to the
position, attributed to Thrasymachus, that justice amounts
to the advantage of the more powerful, making it relative to
whoever wields the power, a positivist position that
antedates Hans Kelsen by many centuries. 112  No
cosmology, no knowledge of a Divine Being, and no
cosmic justice enter into this brutish1 13 and potentially
brutal position.1 1 4  Thus, if we extend the logic of the
'08 See, e.g., J.M. ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK
PHILOSOPHY (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1968); THE PRE-SOCRATICS
(Philip Wheelwright ed., Odyssey Press 1966).
109 See JONATHAN BARNES, THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS
(Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979).
110 For an elaboration on the notion of Logos, see 1 W.K.C. GUTHRIE,
A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 419-34 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1962).
111 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 109; THE PRE-SOCRATICS supra
note 109.
112 PLATO, REPUBLIC (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
113 We would have the Hobbesian condition of "the life of man,
solitary, [poor], nasty, brutish, and short" THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 104 (E.P. Dutton 1950).114 See THE PRE-SOCRATICS, supra note 109, at 239-50.
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proposition that justice amounts only to the dictates of the
powerful, oppression can, strangely enough, become
"justice." Such a position contorts itself thereby into a
logical contradiction.
The Sophists present the specter of legal positivism
and formalism that would preclude "[t]he Moment of Truth
for a practicing attorney [which] occurs whenever a
prospective client tells a story that seems morally
compelling but legally hopeless. . . . Too much injustice
persists in the world because tired legal thinking has
accepted unjust patterns as inevitable."" 
5
It fell, then, to the great Socrates to recall Athens to
the quest for true knowledge and justice, rather than
settling for the superficial appearances and conventions of
the Sophist "spin-doctors." He thereby enabled Plato to re-
address the deep conditions of the human soul, and in doing
so, to bring into focus the idea of a structure of justice in
the universe and its transcendent source, notions
desperately needed in law, including international law,
whether in the West or in the East.
B. An Account of Socrates
At the trial where his life hung in the balance,
Socrates responded to the charge of corrupting the
Athenian youth:
I do nothing but go about persuading you
all, old and young alike, not to take thought
for your persons or your properties, but first
and chiefly to care about the greatest
improvement of the soul . . . I tell you that
virtue is not given by money, but that from
virtue comes money and every other good of
man, public as well as private. This is my
115ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 289.
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teaching, and if this is the doctrine that
corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous
person... I sought to persuade every man
among you that he must look to himself and
seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to
his private interests .... The difficulty, my
friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid
unrighteousness.
And will life be worth living, if that higher
part of man be destroyed, which is improved
by justice and depraved by injustice?
1 6
Socrates both describes and exemplifies a laudable life, one
that surely rose to supranormal n 7 proportions. Professor
Anthony D'Amato wrote that "to Socrates, and presumably
to the Athenian citizenry as a whole, judging from the
evidence which exists, a trial and judgment was simply an
attempt by the tribunal to apply 'the law,' an immutable
concept which somehow had a separate, independent
existence unchanged by specific cases."11 8 Herein lies
another statement of the higher law, which every epoch,
including the 21st century, ought to follow. Here is a noble
example of magnanimity in the face of manifest injustice.
Although Socrates himself faced death, he believed
that in the greater scheme of things, nothing ultimately
116 PLATO, APOLOGY 30, 36, 39, 49 (B. Jowett trans., Random House
1937).
117 Plato's life rose to the supernormal at least in the statistical, social-
psychological sense, but more importantly in the sublime, moral sense.
See THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: A VALUE-COMMIrED
INTRODUCTION (Michael R. Leming et al. eds., Academic Books
1989)(drawing distinctions between variations of the term "normal" in
chapter on social change in theory and practice).
118 ANALYTIC JURIsPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 119,
quoted in Anthony D'Amato, Obligation to Obey the Law: A Study of
the Death of Socrates, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1079, 1080 (1976).
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detrimental could happen to the good person. 1' 9 While this
sacrificial speech extolling justice and virtue was the
crowning achievement of Socrates' life, it is also a fitting
introduction to Socrates' prize pupil Plato, and his
contribution to this topic.
C. Plato
Many of Plato's dialogues concern the virtues, such
as justice, wisdom, and prudence. Like many Asian
philosophers, his political writings, including Republic,
Statesman, and Laws, address the improvement of the
soul. 120
In the Republic, Plato reasoned that the guardians
were "to live together in the continual practice of virtue,
which was to be their sole pursuit." 121  One may question
whether most politicians, attorneys, judges, and other
national leaders actually believe that "[tihe art of politics
has to do with the soul: what gymnastics and medicine are
to the body, legislation and the administration of justice are
to the SoUl., 122  Thankfully, those who take seriously a
jurisprudence of justice, virtue, and higher law still
contemplate such statements. It hardly fits, however, the
mold of a demagogue who runs roughshod over his own
people.
Plato even criticized the renowned Pericles, saying
that Pericles should have sought "to implant justice in their
souls and take away injustice, to implant temperance and
119 SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, (Marcus Dods trans., Hafner
1945). St. Augustine expresses similar notions in works such as the
magisterial De Civitatis Dei, which many consider his magnum opus.
120 See generally, PLATO, LAWS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random
House 1937); PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 113; PLATO, STATESMAN
(Julia Annas & Robin Waterfield eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
121 PLATO, TLMAEUS 18 (Donald J. Zeyl trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 2000).
122 PLATO, GORGIAS 464 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books
1971).
49
2:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 50
take away intemperance, to implant virtue and take away
every vice." 123  Plato's central thesis throughout his
published works is that the most important task in this life
is the improvement of the soul through virtue.124 It is not a
mere, surface behaviorism. Rather, it is more akin to
Harold Koh's notion of internalization. 125  One might
question whether Plato's central thesis might find more
widespread and profounder application in international, as
well as domestic, law.
The Sophists are akin to the American public's
perception of the legal profession. Plato roundly criticizes
the Sophists' use of rhetoric as solely a way to win wealth
or power, rather than to instill virtue. 126 Plato shows the
problems with Thrasymachus's definition of justice as
whatever benefits the stronger because it assumes that the
strong really apprehend what is best, and thus, that they are
wiser than the weak.127  Thrasymachus's definition
suggests a move towards anarchy if people are constantly
and illegitimately vying with each other for power and
dominance, and it leads to ignoring justice or defending
injustice as the better way to life. 128 These criticisms
actually apply to misguided relativism as applied to law,
and open the door to ill-conceived self-interest. This
threatens what Thomas Hobbes subsequently referred to as
the "[war] of every man against every man, this also is
consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of
Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no
place." 129  Furthermore, it can make no transcendently
binding distinction between good and evil, justice and
injustice. If what Gandhi called soul force does not prevail,
1231Id. at 504, 513-14.
12 4 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 113, at 338-52.
125 Koh, supra note 10.
126 PATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 113.
1 2 7 
id.
128 id.
129 HOBBES, supra note 114, at 112.
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then other force-be it military, governmental, or legal-
often does. 130 International law generally depends more on
its stake in justice and higher law than the march of troops
to enforce their orders. It usually must win voluntary
acceptance of its jurisdiction and good-faith compliance
with its orders. Thus justice, virtue, and higher law gain
greater significance in the international law context.
In Phaedrus, Plato expresses concern about
sophistical rhetoric 131 that seems hauntingly applicable to
what passes as law and international law. According to this
view, the orator need only understand the beliefs of his
judges, who judge him on the art of persuasion, not on the
truth of the matter. 132 The orator can extol evil as being
good, and might persuade the public as well to do evil
instead of good. 133 He influences their souls, but without
true knowledge.' 34 To what end does he sway others-
merely self-interested ones? Such criticisms must be taken
seriously if legal and political discourse is to rise above
sophistry. This position does not, however, exclude
prudential uses of rhetorical (yet honest) tools harnessed to
just causes in accordance with higher law and justice
because there is an important distinction between these two
positions.
When distilled, one of the issues is between opinion
and knowledge and the other between appearance and
reality. When Protagoras expresses the opinion that man is
the measure of all things, this notion, if logically pushed to
its limits, affirms all opinions-including the opinion that
his own opinion is false. 135 So even Protagoras must admit
130 Dr. Samuel Ling, Asian History Lecture (Spring 1996).
131 PLATO, PHAEDRAS, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 169-72, 177-79 (B.




135 PLATO, THEAETETUS, in 4 THE DiALoGUEs OF PLATO 268-69, 288-
90, 304-06, 308 (B. Jowett trans., 3d ed., Clarendon Press 1892).
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that at least one opinion is wiser and truer than another; but
this deduction makes the wiser and truer notions into the
measure of things. Thus, man in general is not the measure
of all things because not all opinions are equally valuable,
true, wise, or worthwhile. 136 So there must be some anchor
of justice, virtue, and higher law, such as the related set of
honesty, veracity, and integrity, as contrasted with
mendaciousness, duplicity and falseness, by which to
ground such statements.
The relativist is deceived into thinking that, because
the world is continually changing in its temporal
particularities, justice, virtue, and higher law are also
mutating. If so, then everything is in a process of
becoming; unchanging "being," or in other words,
permanent, essential ontologies, are then abolished. Noting
that appearances and temporal contingencies change does
not lead one ineluctably to conclude that the underlying
reality changes too.
Plato's famous cave analogy speaks to this point. 1
37
The Sophist relativist is like a prisoner who, suffering from
a form of amnesia and confined to a world of flitting
shadows, supposes these appearances to be all the reality
there is. 138 If he could think, if he could look behind
himself, if he could exit the cave, his reality would be very
different. 139 The Sophist fails because his rhetoric is not
liberated by knowledge of the truth, but is instead a slave to
opinions based on appearances, the convenience of
expedience, temporal contingencies, prestige, or other
factors that vary from place to place and from one
individual to another. 140 Sophistical resistance to justice,
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to all sophistical opinions-whether by judicial, legislative,
or executive branches.
Sheer pragmatism or formalism is not enough.
Justice and injustice are not changing expedients for
changing circumstances; they are rooted in a changeless
reality indiscernible by the physical senses alone. So then
it is not Socrates, but the Sophists, who impoverished the
souls of Athenian youth by failing to extol justice, virtue,
and higher law.
In Timaeus, Plato discusses how God set things in
order and constructed the cosmos by giving to all things
proportion, measure, and harmony. 141 According to Plato,
this cosmic harmony should extend to the law-governed
city where justice means the harmony of right, just
relationships, and proportionate treatment, and also to the
good life ruled wisely by the virtue graced soul. 14 2  As
musical harmony depends on mathematical relationships
between notes, so must human life be properly ordered if it
is not to end in painful discord, dissolution, or even death.
Indeed Plato declares, "The harmony of the soul is
virtue. ' 143 So the discussion again centers on virtue. Even
modicums of virtue can help prevent some of the tragedies
that legal systems repeatedly endure.
In Republic, Plato calls for rule by wise,
philosopher-kings rigorously educated to disciplined habits
aimed at true understanding and the continual pursuit of the
good. 144 Such people can help add to the stature of legal
systems and the profession.
Plato's theory of forms as unchanging, transcendent
ideals 145 becomes relevant here. Reason1'46 does not
141 PLATO, TIMAEUs, supra note 122.
142 Id.
143 PLATO, LAWS, supra note 121, at 653.
144 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 113.
145 Id.
146 The use of the term "reason" is in the broader, classical sense. It
includes virtue and a healthy conscience along with rationality and
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develop mere opinions about justice and then apply them in
governing the appetites. 147  The mind does not fabricate
virtues, but rather it discovers what is objectively and
inherently good. 148  The goal is to attain, however
imperfectly or fallibly, to what justice, virtue, and higher
law really are, rather than how they appear to a
Thrasymachus or to any other person. An objective rooting
in real justice, virtue, and higher law still exists, and a just
legal system, by definition, depends upon these realities
and our best efforts to apprehend and apply them. 
149
In Laws, Plato proposes the model of a law-
governed community in which the people themselves value
the good. 150 Indeed, a person's entire energy throughout
life should be devoted to the development of virtue. Plato
ultimately concludes that it is not mere mortals, but God
who ought to be the measure of all things.
151
It is important to note that Plato's conception of
knowledge is not just a matter of knowledge as against
ignorance or opinion, nor just an ability to define or
describe a virtue. 152 Discernment between good and evil is
required, along with the practiced capacity for making
sound judgments that recognize goodness when
logic.
147 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 113.
148 id.
149 Many centuries later, scholars such as St. Thomas Aquinas and
others built on this foundation. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE
ON LAW (R.J. Henle trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1993).
Presumably, one should not extend hate towards people, but to that
which contravenes justice. Hating injustice because of loving [Greek:
agape] people against whom the injustice is wrought deserves the label
virtue. At the same time, that hate should not extend even to the
perpetrator of the injustice.
150 PLATO, LAWS, supra note 121.
151 See id. at 653, 717, 770.
152 See JOHN GOULD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S ETHICs (Russell
& Russell 1972) (1955).
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exemplified in particular cases. 53 Furthermore, it is not a
detached, unemotional kind of thinking, but is filled with
wonder at and a deep devotion to the good. 154 Such a
framework exercises virtue, pursues justice, and comports
with higher law.
Plato employs the analogy of a lover absorbed day
and night with his beloved, or rather, with the ideals that
the beloved exemplifies. 155 According to Plato, our calling
in the legal and governmental spheres and in life is to
romance and be romanced by justice, virtue, and higher
law.
Similarly, in Phaedrus Plato likens the soul to a
charioteer with two winged horses, one wanton and wild,
the other spirited but controllable, soaring towards the sun
in all its majesty. I56  As long as the wanton horse is
uncontrolled, there can be no united effort and both horse
and charioteer plunge down to the earth again and again. 157
But if the driver guides the spirited horse while giving it
the lead, then its strength will control the wanton one so
that they will pull together and soar to the heavens.
158
Plato speaks of the higher aspects of humans harnessing the
appetitive or animal side. 159  The brute inside must be
disciplined to soar to the heavens.16° Otherwise, the host
of horrors that parade through this world will march on.
Plato, as an encapsulation, states, "Wherefore we
ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we
can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is
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and wise." 16 1 In other words, it is an exhortation towards a
just and virtuous life under the highest possible law. This
view has become all too rare as Western Civilization has
reached what Harold Berman calls the "twilight of
transcendence." 1
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Plato continues this same theme in Laws when he
writes that "he who would be dear to God must, as far as is
possible, be like him and such as he is." 163 Several motifs
emerge from these writings. First, this entire metaphysical
discussion grounds itself in unchanging and transcendent
Fact and Reality-in virtue, justice, and higher law. In this
sense, law is a fact. 164  Second, Plato's forms theory
introduced a theory of universals with unchanging natures
that dominated the jurisprudence of most of the history of
Western Civilization, which continues to this day. This is
the best foundational theory for international law and law
in general.
In Statesman, Plato likens God to a statesman
shepherding his people, but in Laws Plato offers his last
and most detailed account. 165 Plato describes God as
powerful, purposeful, intelligent, and good in an outgoing
way because everything he designs is directed toward the
overall goodness of the universe. 166 Individual virtue and
the just city-state are supposed to be part of this cosmic
161 PLATO, THEAEETIUs, supra note 136, at 235.
162 See BERMAN, supra note 4.
163 PLATO, Laws, available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.4.iv.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
For an alternative translation, see also PLATO, THE LAWS 175 (Trevor
J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970) ("you must do your level best
to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the
moderate man is God's friend, being like him").
164 See Anthony D'Amato, On the Connection Between Law and
Justice, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (1993).
165 See, e.g., PLATO, LAWS, supra note 121, at 894-903; PLATO,
STATESMAN, supra note 121, at 269-75
166 See, e.g., PLATO, LAWS, supra note 121.
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harmony. Because they imitate God's goodness, they are
microcosms of the whole.167 Each legal system, whether
international or domestic, can aspire to such lofty
objectives.
The chief purpose of Timaeus seems to be to link
justice to the structure of the cosmos-higher law. 168 This
higher law grounds itself in reality, in the forms, in the
nature of the soul, in cosmic harmony, in the idea of the
good, and in God. No better theoretical framework exists.
In contrast to secularized individualism, skepticism,
and relativism that prevail in present legal culture, Plato
tells the reader:
The ruler of the universe has ordered all
things with a view to the excellence and
preservation of the whole, and each part, as
far as may be, has an action and passion
appropriate to it. . . one of these portions of
the universe is thine own, unhappy man,
which, however little, contributes to the
whole . . . and in order that the life of the
whole may be blessed; and that you are
created for the sake of the whole, and not
the whole for the sake of you. 169
167 Id.
16 8 PLATO, TIRAEUS, supra note 122.
1
6 9 ATO, Laws, available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws. 1O.x.html. For an alternate
translation, see also PLATO, THE LAWS 437 (Trevor J. Saunders trans.,
Penguin Books 1970) ("The supervisor of the universe has arranged
everything with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its
individual parts lay appropriate active or passive roles according to
their various capacities... a mere speck that nevertheless constantly
contributes to the good of the whole - is you, you who have forgotten
that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life
of prosperity. You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you
exist for the sake of the universe.").
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Hence, Plato thinks the good is ultimately found in a more
wholistic and community context, and ultimately, in the
mind of God. If law does not contribute in this way, it
loses an important facet of its raison d'etre.
In their thinking about the cosmos, the early Greek
philosophers struggled to distinguish between appearances
and reality. Plato and Aristotle extended this concern into
the metaphysical domain suggesting that what appears to
some to be the good in reality may not be so. 170 Pleasure,
wealth, power, or success may be sought as the highest
ends, when in reality they are not. This confusion between
appearance and reality in ethics underlies the contest
between two dominant images of human life that Alasdair
Macntyre finds in a post-Homeric reflection-a life
aiming at virtue or excellence (arete) and a life aiming at
superficial "success" or power. 171  Every branch of
government would do well to pursue the former rather than
the latter.
The former image of virtue or excellence (arete) is
found in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The latter image
of superficial success or power is also found in the writings
of Aristotle's one-time student, Alexander the Great.
172
Neither power nor success, nor pleasure, nor wealth is in
reality the highest good, even though to some people they
appear so. This claim does not deny the value of success,
pleasure, or wealth in the service of virtuous ends.
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle concerned themselves
with the improvement of the soul and developed an ethic of
virtue grounded in the ordered nature of reality as a
whole. 173 Those in or influential to legal systems would be
170 id.
171 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 88
(Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1988).
172 id.
173 See FINNIS, supra note 7, at ch. 8 (analyzing and synthesizing
important strands of thought of these foremost Hellenic thinkers).
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well advised to follow such an approach rather than making
positivistic or formalistic excuses for injustice, vice, or
violations of higher law. To Plato's student, Aristotle, we
turn next for further grounding in justice, virtue, and higher
law the best basis for law as a whole and international law
especially.
D. Aristotle: Justice, Telos, Virtue, and the Higher
Life through Higher Law
Aristotle merges the notion of justice with virtue by
crowning justice as the apogee of virtue in relation to
others:
Thus, this kind of justice is complete virtue
or excellence, not in an unqualified sense,
but in relation to our fellow men. And for
that reason justice is regarded as the highest
of all virtues, more admirable than morning
star, and, as the proverb has it, "In justice
every virtue is summed up." It is complete
virtue and excellence in the fullest sense,
because it is the practice of complete virtue.
It is complete because he who possesses it
can make use of his virtue in their own
affairs, but who are incapable of using it in
their relations with others. Therefore, the
saying of Bias seems to be apt that "Ruling
will show the man," for being a ruler already
implies acting in relation to one's fellow
men and within society. For the very same
reason, justice alone of all the virtues is
thought to be the good of another, because it
is a relation to our fellow men in that it does
what is of advantage to others, either to a
ruler or to a fellow member of society.
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Now, the worst man is he who practices
wickedness toward himself as well as his
friends, but the best man is not one who
practices virtue toward himself, but who
practices it toward others. For that is a hard
thing to achieve. 
174
Aristotle does not stop with justice as a perfect
virtue in human relationships alone. In addition, he hints at
the relation between human virtue, higher law, justice, and
the divine. 175  Being is not morally neutral; in fact, the
world of particulars is laden with issues of justice
throughout, 176 including matters in the international law
domain, as well as domestic law spheres.
Aristotle states:
If God is always in that good state in which
we sometimes are, this compels our wonder:
and if in a better state this compels it yet
more. And God is in a better state. And life
belongs to God; for the actuality of thought
is life, and God is that actuality .... We say
therefore that God is a living being, eternal,
most good, so that life and duration
continuous and eternal belong to God."'
177
The just and virtuous-the human telos178 -is the
full development of this potential, 179 which is our highest
174 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETIncs 114 (Martin Ostwald trans.,
Macmillan 1986) (internal citations omitted).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics. 12.xii.html.
178 In Greek, telos means "end" or "purpose." "God and nature," writes
Aristotle, "create nothing that has not its use." ARISTOTLE, ON THE
HEAVENS, 271A.33 (Harv. Univ. Press 2000) (1957).
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good. It is eudaimonia, usually translated "happiness," but
actually closer to "well-being," although "well" simply
reiterates "good" ("being" itself being good). Aristotle
elaborates: the human good is the activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue (arete).180  Such activity never
violates and always harmonizes with higher law.
Moral virtues are the excellence of the appetitive
life, whereas intellectual virtues indicate excellence in the
life of the mind.181  Such human flourishing is
compromised, according to Aristotle, in those who live for
pleasure, wealth, or honor. Other animals have such
appetites too, yet only humans have the power to reason
including the healthy functioning of the conscience and to
guide those appetites. 182 The human telos does not exclude
pleasure or other such satisfactions; indeed, achieving the
good brings its own pleasure. 183  No other species has
courts, legislatures, or executive branches-or the
deliberative processes found in legal, political, and
academic discussions.
Actualizing such a life is a developmental process;
the Maker grants the capacity, but to develop it requires
just habits. Just habits require just choices repeatedly made
and reinforced until they become second nature. 184 Just
choices, in turn, must be determined by practical reason
deliberating about what accords with higher law. The
various appetites, as well as pleasure and pain in general,
may be felt both too much and too little, and neither side of
the spectrum from the balanced center is good. 185 But to
"9 Potential translates to dunamis in the Greek.
180 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs supra note 175; see also JOHN
IvL COOPER, REASON AND HUMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE ch. 1 (Harv.
Univ. Press 1975).
'8' ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, supra note 178.182 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETICS, supra note 175, at 16-17.
183 Id. at 20-22.
184 Id. at 33-35.
185 Id. at 36-38.
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feel them, at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and
in the just way, mediates between these extremes and
characterizes virtue. 186 Herein, we find Aristotle's famous
Golden Mean between extremes. 187
So what are the implications for jurisprudence, for
the state, and for laws? The "best kind of state exists not
just to provide external goods but for the good of the
soul-in effect, to make men good ... the state therefore
inculcates right habits by means of just laws."188 Aristotle
also states, "For legal judgment decides and distinguishes
between what is just and what is unjust."1 89 This venerable
sage continues:
This is why we do not allow the rule of a
man but the rule of reason because a man
takes too large a share for himself and
becomes a tyrant. A (true) ruler, however, is
the guardian of what is just and as such, he
is also the guardian of equality and
fairness. 
190
All in society, especially those distinctly responsible as
leaders of the legal and political realms, should help further
such ends that abide by the rule of law, nourished by higher
law through justice.
Henry Veatch, an Aristotle scholar, tells us that the
most important end of knowledge is not knowledge of
humankind, because humans are not the most important
entities in the universe. 191 According to Aristotle, the very
186 id.
871d at 111.
188 ARISTOTLE, THE POLmCS, 1.1-2, VII.1-3 (Steven Everson ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
189 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 175, at 129-30.
'90Id. at 130.
191 See HENRY B. VEATCH, ARISTOTLE: A CONTEMPORARY
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nature of our being points us beyond ourselves; humans are
not the measure of all things, for only God is perfectly
good. 192 In reality, the human telos, our highest end, is
God.193 Pursuing justice, virtue, and higher law created by
the Uncreated 194 then justly becomes the virtuous pursuit
of every state and every legal system, most vividly in the
international sphere, but also in domestic realms.
IV. Conclusion
In any legal system, but especially international
legal systems, this foundation of justice, virtue, and higher
law alone will sustain long-term flourishing and
fulfillment, both individually and societally. It points the
way towards progress and needed reform of positive law.
The accumulated weight of wise words over the centuries
from both the East and the West1 95 exhort us in this
direction. It is a safeguard against such monstrosities as
Nazi, Maoist, and Stalinist oppression, and acts as a beacon
to light the way into the future of our global village.
The words of the great 20th-century Princeton
McCormick Chairholder and jurisprudential scholar Edwin
Corwin provide a fitting finale to this essay:
There are, it is predicated, certain principles
of right and justice which are entitled to
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence,
APPRECIATION (Indiana Univ. Press 1974).
192 id.
193 Id.
194 As Dostoevsky indicated, if God is dead, then everything is
permissible. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOv
(Ralph E. Matlaw ed., Constance Garnett trans., Norton & Co. 1976);
see also, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance
Gamett trans., Dutton 1963).
195 See Finnis, supra note 7, at ch. 8 (handling profound thoughts from
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas).
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altogether regardless of the attitude of those
who wield the physical resources of the
community. Such principles were made by
no human hands. . . .They are eternal and
immutable. In relation to such principles,
human laws are, when entitled to obedience
save as to matters indifferent, merely a
record or transcript, and their enactment an
act not of will or power but one of discovery
and declaration. 1
Thus, the pronouncements of every legal system,
international especially, but also domestic, the judgments
of every court, the formulations of every legislature, the
decisions of every executive, should discover,1 97 declare
and follow accordingly. It would result in greater
worthiness to lead and greater legitimacy for people to
follow. Herein, lay the seeds of true progress1 98 and
reform.
196 CORWNI, supra note 9, at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
197 "In contrast, natural lawyers claim that morality is not so much to be
defined as to be discovered; reality is not created but apprehended."
NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 18, at
8.
198 While rejecting the notion of automatic, inexorable "progress," the
use here nonetheless promises progress to the extent justice, higher
law, and virtue are embraced.
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TOWARD EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS
Douglas A. Blaze *
"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."
I. Introduction
If the goal is equal access to justice, as it must be,
the pro bono efforts of lawyers are relatively insignificant.
Despite years of exhortation by an impressive assortment
of judges and bar leaders and the addition of increasingly
strong aspirational language in professional rules,' an
abysmally small percentage of lawyers engage in pro bono
representation. 2  According to the best national estimate,
lawyers provide on average less than a half-an-hour per
week of assistance to the poor.3  Staff attorneys from
federally-funded legal aid programs provide most of the
civil legal services available to low-income clients.4 The
* Art Stolnitz and Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law and
Director of Advocacy and Clinical Programs, University of Tennessee
College of Law. Professor Blaze also served for several years as Chair
of the Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services and continues to serve as
faculty advisor to UT Pro Bono.




1 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state: "Every lawyer
has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 6.1 (2003).
2 Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated
Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 94 (2002).
3 Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 283, 291 (1998).
4 The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) administers the federal grant
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pro bono efforts of private attorneys supplement the work
of the legal aid offices. But even legal aid and pro bono
efforts combined only serve, at best, twenty-percent of the
civil legal needs of the poor. 5  Not only is the situation
unlikely to improve in any significant way in the future, it
may be getting worse.
6
For pro bono to be a meaningful component of any
comprehensive effort to significantly increase the
availability of legal services to the indigent, 7 there must be
structural changes to the system of the delivery of pro bono
legal services. The present system of shared responsibility
between the federally-funded legal service providers and
the private bar has not been sufficiently effective in
program to civil legal aid programs. See 45 C.F.R. § 1600-1644
(2002).
5 Maute, supra note 2, at 94; see also Douglas A. Blaze, The Crisis in
Legal Aid: Working Together, We Just Might Make a Difference,
TENN. B. J., Jan. 2003, at 14 (reviewing Tennessee statistics).
6 For example, current federal support for legal services adjusted for
inflation is approximately one-half of the 1980 funding level. See
Federal Funding Follies Chart, Equal Just. Mag., Summer 2002 at 18-
19, available at
http://www.ejm.lsc.gov/EJMIssue2/federalfunding/federalfundingchart
.jpg. Even more telling, a recent study in Tennessee found that only
5% of the civil legal needs of the poor are being met. See Thomas J.
Galligan, Jr., Understanding the Unrepresented: The Tennessee
Statewide Comprehensive Legal Needs Survey for 2003, TENN. B. J.,
Feb. 2005, at 14, 16.
7 There are, of course, a number of alternative ways to address the
problem of limited access to justice, including mandatory pro bono
requirements and increased funding through a special tax on lawyers.
In addition, a number of commentators have questioned the relative
efficacy of pro bono work as a means of meeting the legal needs of the
poor. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democratic Critique of Pro
Bono Publico Representation of The Poor: The Good as the Enemy of
the Best, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 139-57 (2001).
The debate, while very important, is beyond the scope of this brief
essay. The discussion here accepts the legitimacy of the potential
contribution of the pro bono efforts to the goal of more equal access to
justice.
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increasing the amount of pro bono work by private lawyers.
To effect the dramatic changes that are required, new
participants are needed and new leaders must step forward.
This essay examines one possible source of new
leadership and additional resources-law schools. Law
schools can be much more than a modest supplemental
source of pro bono services. Using the University of
Tennessee College of Law student pro bono program as an
example, this essay attempts to demonstrate that law
schools are uniquely positioned to assume a vital role in
advancing the cause of equal access to justice.
H. Limitations of the Present System
Most pro bono programs are operated by, or in
association with, federally-funded legal service programs.
The reason is simple-money. Governing regulations
require federally-funded legal service programs to devote
"at least twelve and one-half percent (12 1/2 %) of [their
federal funding] to the involvement of private attorneys in
the delivery of legal services.' 8 The preferred way of
involving private attorneys in serving the poor is through
pro bono representation or reduced fee programs. 9 As a
result, legal aid programs have assumed a prominent role in
the coordination and provision of pro bono legal services.
While many pro bono projects are operated in association
with bar organizations, legal aid offices provide leadership
for the projects by using "private attorney involvement"
(PAI) funds for program administration and coordination.
10
While there are a number of benefits to a
845 C.F.R § 1614.1 (2002).
945 C.F.R. § 1614.23(a) (2002).
10 For example, Legal Aid of East Tennessee (LAET) operates a Pro
Bono Project in the Knoxville, Tennessee area in cooperation with four
county bar associations. Federal funds support a project director and
staff.
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collaborative effort between legal aid programs and the
private bar in the provision of pro bono legal services, there
are inherent structural limitations in such a delivery system.
First, federally-funded legal service programs are subject to
significant regulatory restrictions, which limit who can be
represented, what kind of legal matters can be handled, and
even what types of legal strategies can be employed on
behalf of clients.11 These restrictions effectively extend to
any project in which a federally-funded legal aid program
is involved or any project which is financially supported by
the legal aid program, regardless of the original source of
the supporting funds. 12  Thus, any pro bono program
operated in association with a federally-funded legal aid
provider, as most are, is similarly limited with respect to
clients, case types, and legal strategies. For example, pro
bono lawyers likely would be precluded from representing
many recent immigrants or from filing class actions. 
13
Second, while the predominant paradigm of pro
bono projects as cooperative ventures between legal aid
providers and bar associations may foster collaboration
between the partners, the organizational structure can also
limit the sense of ownership and degree of commitment on
the part of each partner. Both partners share responsibility;
no partner has primary responsibility. Without clearly
identified leadership, accountability for a project's success
" See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1613 (2002) (restricting legal assistance with
respect to criminal proceedings); 45 C.F.R § 1615 (2002) (restricting
actions collaterally attacking criminal convictions); 45 C.F.R. § 1617
(2002) (prohibiting class actions); 45 C.F.R § 1626 (2002) (restricting
legal assistance to aliens); 45 C.F.R. § 1633 (2002) (restricting
representation in certain eviction proceedings); 45 C.F.R. § 1637
(2002) (restricting representation of prisoners); 45 C.F.R. § 1639
(2002) (prohibiting challenges to welfare reform legislation).
12 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (2002) (discussing use of non-LSC funds, transfers
of LSC funds, and program integrity).
13 45 C.F.R. § 1617 (2002) (regarding class actions); 45 C.F.R. § 1626
(2002) (dealing with restrictions on legal assistance to aliens).
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may be diluted, thereby hindering growth and progress.
This problem can be exacerbated by the competing
priorities of the legal service programs. For a legal aid
office, the primary mission will usually be to directly
provide the highest quality legal services to the greatest
number of people having the most significant need.
Committing money and effort to pro bono projects can
conflict with that mission, however, by diverting time and
energy from direct client service. Pro bono initiatives are
viewed, at least by some legal aid personnel, as a less
efficient means of serving the client population.14 As a
result, the overall commitment of a legal aid office to a pro
bono project and its success may be diminished.
Regardless of the reasons, the reality is that the pro
bono efforts fostered by "private attorney involvement"
funding have been met with limited success. Although the
twelve and one-half percent PAI funding requirement has
been in place since 1981,15 there has been no significant
increase in pro bono legal representation by private lawyers
in the intervening two decades. To the contrary, the
contribution of the pro bono efforts of the private bar to
more equal access to justice remains relatively small. 
16
Pro bono can potentially play a much more
important and meaningful role in the struggle for equal
access to justice. 17 To maximize that potential, however,
new partners, new leaders, and new approaches need to be
identified and utilized. Numerous commentators have
14 See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal
Services to Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1751, 1785-86
(1999) [hereinafter Recommendations] (discussing the need to evaluate
PAl initiatives).
" Id. at 1785.
16 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
17 See Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for
Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2415, 2415-16
(1999) (discussing the valuable historical contribution of pro bono
work).
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argued that law schools have a special responsibility-
ethically, morally, and pedagogically-to participate in
programs providing pro bono legal assistance to the poor.'
8
This essay expressly adopts and embraces those arguments.
The thesis of this essay, however, is somewhat different.
Not only do law schools have a particular responsibility to
participate in the provision of pro bono legal services, law
schools are uniquely positioned to assume a crucial role in
advancing the cause of equal access to justice through such
participation.
I. Why Law Schools: An Example
The University of Tennessee College of Law has
sponsored a student pro bono program, known as UT Pro
Bono, for over ten years.' 9 Like many law school pro bono
projects, the program is limited in the amount and scope of
services provided.2 ° Yet, even as the project is presently
configured, the contribution is not insignificant: 33% of
the students participate in collaboration with 60 alumni
lawyers, providing nearly 1400 hours of pro bono service
18 See, e.g., id. at 2433-36; James L. Baillie & Judith Bernstein-Baker,
In the Spirit of Public Service: Model Rule 6.1, The Profession and
Legal Education, 13 LAW & INEQUALITY 51, 62-67 (1994); Howard
Lesnick, Why Pro Bono in Law Schools, 13 LAW & INEQUALITY 25,
25-
29 (1994); David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of
Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58, 68-70 (1999); Christina L. Rosas,
Note, Mandatory Pro Bono Publico for Law Students: The Right Place
to Start, 30 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1069, 1075-78 (2002).
19 For more information on UT Pro Bono, see UT Pro Bono,
http://www.law.utk.edu/departments/CLMC/clinicprobono.htm (last
visited Sept. 9, 2005).
20 For extensive information on law school pro bono programs,
including the report of the Commission on Pro Bono and Public
Interest Opportunities of the Association of American Law Schools,
see Association of American Law Schools, www.aals.org/probono/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
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annually.2 1 Moreover, there are several attributes of UT
Pro Bono that effectively demonstrate the considerable
potential for law schools to play a key role in the provision
of pro bono legal services. For example, law schools are
uniquely situated to provide access to valuable sources of
expertise and new resources that could be mobilized on
behalf of pro bono clients.
A. Interdisciplinary Resources
One of the most successful components of UT Pro
Bono is the Family Justice Project. Law students and
lawyers participating in the Family Justice Project
interview, counsel, and assist with the legal needs of the
families of students enrolled at three elementary schools in
Knoxville. The three schools are designated as "full-
service" schools, meaning that each school serves as an
access point for the families to a panoply of social and legal
services. The project, which is the brainchild of Professor
Robert Kronick of the University of Tennessee College of
Education, Health, and Human Sciences, operates as an
interdisciplinary collaboration between students and faculty
at the College of Law, faculty from the College of
Education, local social services agencies, and Legal Aid of
East Tennessee (LAET). The interdisciplinary cooperation
enables project teams to utilize a more holistic approach to
the social and legal problems presented by the client
families.
The law school involvement has been crucial to the
success of the program. As part of a larger university, the
law school has been able to serve as a connection between
the education faculty and the other partners. At the same
21 Statistics for the 2001-2002 and 2004-2005 academic years are
contained in project records on file with the author. Specifically, the
student hours recorded for 2001-2002 and 2004-2005 were in excess of
1400 and 1100 hours respectively.
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time, significant connections between the law school and
LAET provide a bridge between the legal aid program and
other participating individuals and organizations.
As the Family Justice Project demonstrates, law
schools have enormous potential to provide connections to
other academic departments to facilitate innovative
interdisciplinary approaches to the social and legal needs of
the poor. So far the experience of UT Pro Bono has been
that other academic departments are uniformly enthusiastic
about getting involved. For example, both the College of
Social Work and the College of Nursing have assisted with
a component program of UT Pro Bono that assists victims
of domestic violence.
The value of such a multi-disciplinary approach to
the legal needs of the poor is widely recognized.22 The
newest label for this type of legal service program is
"holistic representation." This approach requires
consideration and analysis of the legal problem being
confronted in the context of the client's life and larger
community problems. The "whole client condition is
crucial, not just case resolution." 23 An essential element of
this broader problem-solving strategy is reliance on other
professionals like social workers.
24
Yet, just getting people together is not enough.
Law schools have to commit not only to the task of
bringing various disciplines to the table; law schools have
to commit to the more challenging responsibility of
facilitating and coordinating the efforts of those disciplines
for the benefit of clients with legal and social problems.
This role, however, is appropriate for law schools and one
22 See, e.g., Recommendations, supra note 14, at 1766.
23 Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community:
Expanding the Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing
Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 401, 429 (2001)
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that law schools are well-situated to assume.
B. Connections To The Profession
Law students are naturally interested in a very wide
range of practice areas; UT Pro Bono, being designed and
run by law students, reflects the breadth of those interests.
UT Pro Bono includes programs that serve the homeless,
victims of domestic violence, low-income taxpayers,
inmates with potential innocence claims, and immigrants,
among others. These programs are operated in association
with the private bar, selected alumni, the public defender,
the criminal defense bar, and several legal aid offices.
The breadth of these connections represents an
opportunity, as yet unrealized, to address a significant flaw
in the present system of delivering legal services to the
poor. Sources of legal services for low-income clients are
overly compartmentalized. Different legal service
providers often operate in relative isolation from other
providers.25 For example, civil legal aid lawyers cannot
handle any criminal matter, even when the criminal
proceeding is directly related to a client's civil case and the
criminal matter may significantly affect the resolution of
the civil case.2 6 Yet, there is little, if any, collaboration or
cooperation between public defenders representing indigent
criminal defendants and legal aid lawyers serving
essentially the same clients.
27
25 Recognizing this problem, the Legal Services Corporation initiated a
controversial planning process designed to encourage greater
coordination and collaboration among federally-funded legal aid
programs and other service providers. See John A. Tull, L.S.C.
Program Letter 98-1, February 12, 1998, available at
www.lsc.gov/foia/pl/98- 1.htm.
26 45 C.F.R. § 1613 (2002).
27 For example, the Knox County Public Defender recently sponsored a
national conference devoted to addressing all of a client's socio-legal
needs, including civil legal problems, through "holistic representation."
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At the same time, there is a renewed or resurgent
interest in addressing the legal and social needs of the poor
in a more coordinated and comprehensive way.
28
Someone needs to facilitate communication and
collaboration to make this "holistic" ideal more of a reality.
The efficacy and efficiency of the provision of legal
services could be improved significantly. Such
collaboration would encourage creative and innovative
approaches to legal and social problems. Initiating a
dialogue between the various providers of legal services to
the poor would be an important first step. As the UT Pro
Bono program demonstrates, law schools can, and should,
assume responsibility for starting the process.
C. Flexibility
One of the key reasons for the success of UT Pro
Bono is the inherent flexibility of the overall program. As
student interest has changed or new client needs have
become apparent, new components of the program have
been created.29  For example, in the past few years, the
immigrant Hispanic population of East Tennessee has
increased dramatically. There are, however, few social or
legal programs serving this group of people. Legal aid
See The National 40th Anniversary Gideon Celebration,
www.pdknox.org/Gideon/program.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
No civil legal aid lawyer attended this celebration.
28 See, e.g., Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through
Multidisciplinary Practice - Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While
Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 787 (2002); Ellen
Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical
View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62
MD. L. REv. 288 (2003).
29 The downside of a student-run program is, of course, the possibility
that as student interest wanes or particular students graduate, projects
may decline or even fade away. An institutional commitment by the
school to the new projects can mitigate, if not eliminate, this problem.
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programs, as discussed previously, are limited by
regulatory restrictions in their ability to serve many
immigrants. 30  To fill the void of available services, a
member of the law faculty, Fran Ansley, and several law
students created the Hispanic Assistance Project in
cooperation with a local Catholic church and several
Spanish-speaking members of the bar. As the project was
initially designed, participating law students and lawyers
provided legal advice and referrals at the Catholic church
one Sunday every month. Over time, the focus of the
project has changed to address more directly identifiable
legal needs of this particular client community.
As the Hispanic Assistant Project illustrates, the
ability to respond quickly, creatively, and without
restriction permits a program to address particular legal
problems more effectively. Flexible program design can
also maximize the special interests, and resulting
commitment, of participating students and lawyers.
Unfortunately, as discussed previously, the structure of the
present prevailing pro bono service delivery system does
not share these attributes.
D. Students and Faculty
UT Pro Bono is student-run and receives limited
law school support. The law school provides office space
and a very modest operating budget. The clinical program
provides minimal secretarial support. The project has no
paid administrator or other staff. Participation is entirely
voluntary, although the law school now recognizes public
service and pro bono work by students. Despite these
limitations, approximately one-third of the law students
participate, contributing an average of 70 hours per
participant. If the law school increased its institutional
commitment by providing a full-time paid coordinator, for
30 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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example, it is reasonable to assume that student
participation would also increase.
There are 187 law schools approved by the
American Bar Association.3 1 In the fall of 2004, total J.D.
enrollment at those schools was over 140,000.3 2  The
potential of this resource is considerable to say the least.
For example, if the "aspirational" goal of a minimum of 50
hours of pro bono work per lawyer contained in the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 33 were applied to law
students, over six and one-half million hours of pro bono
work would be contributed. Even if the requirement were
reduced to a more modest 50 hours of pro bono work
during the three years of law school and only half the
students participated, over one million hours of pro bono
work would still be generated. Even assuming that law
students represent a less efficient method of providing legal
services-due to training and supervision needs-law
students can make a significant contribution to the cause of
greater access to justice.
The indirect benefits of student involvement are
also important. Hopefuly, participation would foster an
increased understanding of the need for equal access to
justice among law students, as well as a desire and
commitment to engage in pro bono or public interest work
after graduation from law school.34 Presumably, the result
would be both a short-term and long-term increase in the
number of "lawyers" providing pro bono legal services.
Participation would also provide students with an
31 ABA-LSAC, Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, app.
A, at 832 (Wendy Margolis et al. eds., Law School Admissions
Council, 2006).
32 Id.
33 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 6.1 (2003).
34 Stephen F. Befort & Eric S. Janus, The Role of Legal Education in
Instilling an Ethos of Public Service Among Law Students: Towards a
Collaboration Between the Profession and the Academy on
Professional Values, 13 LAW & INEQUALIrrY 1, 13 (1994).
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additional opportunity to develop lawyering skills and gain
invaluable experience.
Law faculty can also make a significant
contribution. For example, at The University of Tennessee,
several faculty members have taken the lead in developing
particular student pro bono projects to address problems of
interest to those faculty members. As mentioned
previously, a faculty member was instrumental in
establishing the Hispanic Assistance Project. Another
faculty member, working with the criminal defense bar,
helped create and now serves as faculty advisor to the
Tennessee Innocence Project. As Professor Luban has
noted, somewhat amusingly, some faculty may be reluctant
to take on significant case or client responsibility. 35 But
faculty participation does not necessarily have to involve
direct legal representation of clients. Faculty participation
can take many forms, including service as experts,
consultants, community educators, and advisors to
particular pro bono projects. And, hopefully, participation
in a limited role by faculty members may instill sufficient
confidence and increase the extent of their involvement.
Admittedly students are not skilled lawyers. Law
students can, however, provide a broad array of services.
Students can assist with client communications, fact
investigation, and legal research.3 6 The range of legal
services law students can effectively provide can be
expanded considerably with appropriate and targeted
training and, most importantly, sufficient supervision.
For students to make a truly meaningful
contribution, there must be a sufficient number of lawyers
35 David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 58, 72 (1999) (noting that academic colleagues often
remark "that they have tenured colleagues they would be afraid to
loose on a hapless client").
36 See generally Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing
Programs as Vehicles for Law Student Pro Bono Service, 8 B. U. PUB.
INT. L. J. 429 (1999).
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participating to provide direction and supervision. Even if
most law faculty became involved, a large number of
additional practicing attorneys would be needed. Any law
school led or sponsored pro bono program has to include
the involvement of a large number of lawyers to help
handle cases and supervise students. Fortunately law
schools have access to an enormous pool of potential
candidates in their alumni.
E. Alumni
More of the nearly 700,000 lawyers in the United
States need to become involved in the provision of pro
bono services. To achieve that goal, new ways of
encouraging participation must be identified. One
possibility that merits serious consideration is utilizing the
existing relationship between law schools and alumni.
All lawyers are-hopefully-alumni of some law
school. Alumni often have a special affinity for, or
connection with, their law school. If law schools became
more directly involved in the provision of pro bono legal
services, the alumni relationship could be used to mobilize
a significant number of attorneys that are not presently
involved with pro bono work. For example, on several
occasions, UT Pro Bono has solicited assistance for
particular projects from alumni in the area. In those
instances, special care was taken to solicit assistance from
alumni lawyers that had not previously participated in the
pro bono project operated jointly by the Knoxville Bar
Association and Legal Aid of East Tennessee. The
response to the UT Pro Bono solicitation was uniformly
overwhelming, as far more lawyers responded than the
student leaders of UT Pro Bono could effectively utilize in
the project.
Law school involvement may also appeal to other
interests of bar members. Many lawyers are very interested
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in legal education and the training of new lawyers. Pro
bono programs can easily be designed to involve both
lawyers and law students in service that provides
significant learning opportunities. For example, through
UT Pro Bono, law students regularly participate in the
LAET Saturday Bar Program. Through the Saturday Bar
Program, lawyers conduct intake interviews of potential
pro bono clients. Law students regularly assist the lawyers
in conducting the interviews and the students have the
opportunity, if appropriate, to assist the pro bono lawyer
ultimately assigned to the case. As a result, students have
the opportunity to learn lawyering skills through direct
experience and observation. Participating lawyers have the
satisfaction of providing both quality legal services to the
client and a valuable educational experience to the law
student.
IV. The Challenges
Obviously there are enormous hurdles that would
have to be overcome before a significant law school-led pro
bono initiative could become a reality. Several, such as
securing sufficient and serious participation by alumni
lawyers and law students, have already been mentioned.
Hopefully, many other problems can be solved through
creative program design and cooperation among the
involved partners.
Securing adequate financial resources, however,
could prove more challenging. Funding for higher
education is a perennial problem, and law schools are no
different. But if the responsibilities for pro bono are shifted
to the law schools, part or all of the funds presently devoted
to pro bono could be proportionately redirected. For
example, a portion of allocated PAI fumds could be shifted
from legal service programs to law school pro bono
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programs where appropriate. 37 The loss of funds by legal
service programs would be offset by the reduction in
responsibility and staffing needs and the renewed ability to
focus exclusively on direct service to clients. The bar
would also have to provide financial support in recognition
of the fact that, even if the law schools begin to provide
needed leadership and coordination, equal access to justice
is a professional responsibility of the entire bar. In
addition, the expanded public service provided by the law
schools may well result in increased funding from new and
existing sources of financial support.
But the biggest challenge would be securing a
commitment from the law schools to accept the
responsibility and to assume the mantle of leadership.
Moreover, the culture of many law schools and law school
faculties may significantly limit the receptivity of those
institutions to accepting the enormous task and
responsibility suggested here. Virtually every law school
professes to have a three part mission: scholarship,
teaching, and service. The reality is, however, that service
lags far, far behind scholarship and teaching in institutional
value and importance. While a pro bono program of the
scale envisioned here would have some educational value,
the program's primary purpose definitely would be service.
Therefore, a law school's willingness to accept and assume
responsibility for pro bono would require a reconsideration,
if not reordering, of institutional values.
38
37 Under present regulations, the restrictions applicable to legal aid
programs would apply to law schools if they received PAl funds. See
supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The combined effort of the
organized bar and law schools could potentially result in changes to the
regulations.
38 See Gregory Vincent, Reviving the Land-Grant Idea Through
Community-University Partnerships, 31 S.U. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2003)
(advocating that land-grant universities should engage in renewed
outreach to address societal problems through university-community
partnerships).
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Gaining law school support would be difficult, but
not impossible, to achieve. For example, thirty years ago,
much of legal academia strongly resisted the idea of
clinical education. Now, however, nearly every law school
has a clinical program of some significance-and trumpets
that fact in recruiting quality students. But the effort will
take time and pressure-pressure from the bench, the bar,
and from within the academy. It would also take a few
pioneering law schools, working in cooperation with the
bar and legal services programs, to lead the way.
V. Conclusion
Most members of the legal profession, even legal
academics, agree that law schools should play some role in
working toward the goal of equal access to justice. But
law schools should and can do far more than just provide
supplemental assistance to existing pro bono programs.
Law schools should and can become vital partners in the
provision of pro bono legal services. Law schools are
uniquely positioned to enlist the assistance of other
disciplines and mobilize the relatively untapped resources
of alumni and law students in the effort. Although the
profession as a whole must be committed to achieving
equal access to justice, law schools can and should lead the
effort.
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EUTHANIZING TE PROFOUNDLY MENTALLY
INCAPACITATED:
A SIMPLE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Bernard A. Eskandari*
I. Introduction
Throughout history, the killing of those that society
deems unfit has gone in and out of fashion. Typically, the
targets of such programs are the mentally disabled, the
physically disabled, and the insane. Sexual orientation,
religious or political beliefs, and propensity for criminality
may become part of the criteria as well, depending on
society's commitment and fervor for such a program. The
apparent reason for killing the unfit is to create a superior
population-a citizenry that is both mentally and
physically superior-while reducing the incidence of those
in society that constitute a drain-those who ostensibly
take more from society than they contribute. Underlying
this bestial policy is a seductive economic argument- if a
society's goal is to maximize wealth, it must be sensible
policy to remove those from society who do not contribute
any wealth and in fact only consume it. Certainly the
wealth of society is increased if the net detractors are
"removed."
This comment will begin by discussing a few
societies that have implemented programs to do away with
those deemed undesirable. Part I contends that it is
unnecessary for the purposes of this paper to draw a bright-
line rule between what is considered a low quality life and
what is not, but will use the profoundly mentally
incapacitated as an example of what policy-makers might
deem a low quality life. Part IV discusses several widely
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Michigan.
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published rationales for euthanizing the profoundly
mentally incapacitated. Part V argues that even if it is
seemingly economically advantageous to euthanize the
profoundly mentally incapacitated, there are both economic
reasons as well as non-economic reasons for why it is not a
beneficial practice for society to implement (i.e. the
"Against Law and Economics" aspect).
II. A Few Different Historical Approaches to Dealing
with Low Quality Lives
In the last hundred years, Nazi Germany
implemented the most robust euthanasia program aimed at
maintaining purity. Amid the turmoil of World War 11,
Hitler's T-4 "euthanasia" program was implemented to
eliminate "life unworthy of life." Germany's mentally
disabled were the first to be deliberately exterminated;
"defective" children were removed from their families and
taken to hospitals where they were exterminated. The
program was soon expanded to include adults in order to
prevent any "deficient" member of the German "master
race" from breeding and passing on their inferiority.' What
the Third Reich first did to the defenseless mentally
disabled would soon include other defenseless people who
were labeled "subhuman" or "useless eaters." One
rationale for the T-4 program-or at least one rationale
given by the government to the German public-was
largely economic. Nazi propaganda posters made the
' Wikipedia Encyclopedia, T-4 Euthanasia Program,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-4_EuthanasiaProgram (last visited
Dec. 21, 2004).
2 Ellen Myers, The Mentally Retarded The Least of our Brethren,
http://www.creationism.org/csshs/v07nlp26.htm (citing Robert H.
Jackson, The Hadamar Trial p. ii. (1949)) (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
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German population aware that a person suffering from a
hereditary defect costs the public 60,000 Reichmarks
during his lifetime. 3 The implicit meaning behind these
posters was, of course, that the German people were better
off without the "hereditary defective."
4
Unfortunately, the United States is not without its
own embarrassing history. While the United States has not
resorted to euthanizing those deemed worthless, it has
participated in mass sterilization. The mentally disabled
have been subjected to unnecessary institutionalization and,
as a result of the eugenics movement, involuntary
sterilization. The idea behind this initiative rested on the
notion that sterilizing large numbers of "defective" people
would prevent the perpetuation of targeted defects and
genetic diseases. 5 Although the mentally ill and disabled
were the most frequent victims of this program, unwed
mothers and boys in reformatories and orphanages were
also included, especially if they were judged to be of low
intelligence. 6  In total, an estimated 60,000 to 100,000
3 See app. A.
4 Between 1933 and 1939, unemployment in Germany dropped from
six million (50% of the German population) to three hundred thousand.
The Nazis and the German Economy,
http://www.historyleamingsite.co.uk/nazis-and-the-german-economy.
htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2004). Of course, this statistic is largely Nazi
propaganda because women were not included in the unemployment
statistics. The unemployed were forced to take whatever work they
were given or be classified as "work shy" and placed in a concentration
camp. Id. Jews lost citizenship, and 1.4 million men were conscripted.
Id.
- See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (concluding that "[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough").
6 Breeding Better Citizens: Forced Sterilization in the U.S. A Hidden
Chapter of American History (ABC News television broadcast, Mar.
22, 2000). Race was also a factor, as a large number of Southern
blacks were sterilized. Id. These sterilizations became known as the
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people were sterilized in the United States.7
Sterilization aside, the mentally disabled are still
not treated particularly well in the United States.
Nightmarish accounts of staff beatings and sexual abuse of
residents in institutions are not uncommon. 8 Shockingly, it
is reported that at one Washington, D.C. area institution,
the dentist was actually a veterinarian. 9 While the United
States has come a long way since the days of forced
sterilizations, no one can seriously argue it has come nearly
far enough.
The Netherlands is not only a western trendsetter in
legalizing drugs and prostitution, but also in allowing
doctors to kill people who want to die. Since 2001, a
medical practitioner in the Netherlands may euthanize a
terminally ill patient who unequivocally expresses a well-
"Mississippi appendectomies." Id.
' Id. State governors have recently started apologizing for past
eugenics laws that led to forced sterilizations. For example, Oregon
Govenor John Kitzhaber apologized for the more than 2,500 forced
sterilizations from 1917 to 1983, which included girls in reform school,
people in mental institutions, and poor women selected by welfare
workers. See Governor Apologizes for Forced Sterilizations, THE
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 3, 2002, at B2. One year later,
Govenor Gray Davis apologized for the more than 19,000 involuntary
sterilizations that took place in California mostly before World War II.
See Davis Apologizes for Sterilizations, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2003, at A4.
8 Louie Estrada, Advocate for Mentally Retarded Found Inspiration in
Misfortune, THE WASH. POST, May 30, 2004, at C10.
9 Id. Some experts believe institutional abuse is so permanent and
unshakable that they have proposed euthanasia for the more severely
retarded persons. A Time to Take Sides, Center on Human Policy,
School of Education, Syracuse University, 1979,
http://soeweb.syr.edu/thechp/TAKESIDES.htm (last visited Dec. 8,
2004) (citing HEIFETZ & MANGEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE: A
NEUROSURGEON SPEAKS OF DEATH WITH CANDOR (Putnam 1975)).
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informed desire to die and who is in unbearable pain,
provided that there are no measures available to make the
patient's suffering bearable. 10 As a result, doctors in the
Netherlands perform around 3,000 "mercy killings" a
year." Outrage over allowing doctors to engage in such
activity was immediate. Opponents unsurprisingly put
forward slippery slope arguments-voluntary euthanasia
today, involuntary euthanasia tomorrow. It looks as though
the opponents might not have been too far off; a hospital in
the Netherlands recently proposed guidelines for mercy
killings of terminally ill newborns and has already
performed such procedures. 12
Performing mercy killings on babies thus raises the
question of whether it is ever appropriate to euthanize a
person who is incapable of deciding for themselves
whether he or she wants to end his or her life. Those in the
Netherlands who support baby euthanasia say that the
guidelines would mirror the guidelines used for adult
patients suffering with great pain and no hope for relief and
would provide that euthanasia of a newborn should be
acceptable when the child's medical team and independent
doctors agree that her pain cannot be eased and when there
is no hope for improvement. 13  Proponents in the
Netherlands point to several examples of afflictions that
may trigger newborn euthanasia: extremely premature
births, brain damage, spina bifida, and epidermosis bullosa
(a rare blistering illness). 14 Dutch officials estimate that
'0 PETER SINGER, RETHmIKiNG LIFE AND DEATH, 146 (St. Martin's
Press 1995).
n Id. at 143.
12 Toby Sterling, Netherlands Hospital Euthanizes Babies, A.P. NEWS,
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involuntary euthanasia would be applicable in only about
ten cases a year. 15
I. What is a Low Quality Life?
This comment will not discuss real-world criteria
for determining a low quality life. Exact line drawing is
not the focus of this comment; the goal is not to make a
policy determination of who falls below the threshold.
Rather, for the purposes of this comment, a low quality life
will be one that ostensibly appears in its totality to cost
society more than it provides. The Nazis, twentieth century
American policy makers, and Dutch officials all dealt with
or are dealing with this issue and each has come to a
different conclusion.' 6  Differentiating between a low
quality life and one that is not low quality does not advance
this comment's purpose, although I do wonder whether any
life is low quality. The relevant question is whether it
would be economically advantageous for society to
terminate low quality lives, assuming we could determine
which lives are low quality and which are not. If some
infallible machine could do the calculations, is this
something we would want to do? Purely for the purpose of
discussion, the reader should consider the following as
examples of lives possibly qualifying as low quality:
someone who is in a permanent vegetative state ("PVS"),
15Id.
16 Ultrasounds are routinely performed during pregnancy and can detect
birth defects such as cleft palate. A study in Israel revealed that after
detection for cleft palate, 95.8% of affected fetuses were aborted.
Gregory Wolbring, The Silenced Targets, Inside Human Genetics and
Genomics, available at http://www.mindfu11y.org/GE/GE4/Silenced-
Targets-WolbringSIS30janO2.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2004).
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someone born with most of his brain missing, 17 or someone
who is profoundly mentally disabled.18  All three
afflictions refer to someone who effectively has no brain
function. For the purposes of this comment, I will use the
generic, non-scientific term "profoundly mentally
incapacitated" to refer to all three and those similarly
afflicted.
IV. Rationale for Terminating Low Quality Lives
Before we begin, I want to consider the factors that
are likely to influence society's treatment of low quality
lives. While people seem to be genetically programmed to
feel protective toward children, we do not seem to feel as
protective towards the mentally disabled. This is
evidenced by the number of mentally disabled patients in
state and private institutions. Such "putting away" behavior
is analogous to the institutionalization of the elderly-as it
17 This condition is known as anencephaly. Babies born with this
condition only have a brain stem and are only capable of reflex actions.
See SINGER, supra note 10, at 39. People who are in a PVS or who
suffer from anencephaly are not conscious and have no hope of
regaining consciousness because the conscious portion of the brain is
either dead or completely missing. Id. PVS is a condition where
patients are considered to have permanently lost the function of their
cerebral cortex. All voluntary reactions or behavioral responses
reflecting consciousness, volition, or emotion at the cerebral cortical
level are absent. Although a PVS patient does not experience any
observable pain or suffering, she remains permanently unaware. See
Christian J. Borthwick, The Permanent Vegetative State: Ethical Crux,
Medical Fiction? 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 167, 168-69 (1996).
's Those that are profoundly mentally retarded have an IQ in the range
of 0-24 and a mental age of 2 years or less. Such people are incapable
of guarding themselves against common physical dangers. See
Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Mental Retardation,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retarded (last visited Dec. 13, 2004).
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seems our love for them diminishes as they get older. 19 It
makes biological sense that our instinctive feeling of
protection towards children would not apply to the elderly
or the profoundly mentally incapacitated. For "[i]nclusive
fitness is unlikely to be promoted by the devotion of huge
resources to the survival of persons who, by reason of
[mental incapacitation or old age], are not reproductively or
otherwise productive, either actually or (like children)
potentially.,
20
If society's goal is to maximize wealth, then it
becomes rather straightforward why euthanizing lives that
provide negative value to society makes sense. If we were
to remove each negative valued life in society, there would
be a net gain in wealth. For example, imagine we have a
society of three people and we are able to determine that
person A contributes 20 units of wealth to society, person B
contributes 10 units of wealth to society, and person C
contributes -5 units of wealth to society (consumes 5 units
of wealth from society). With person C in this society, the
total wealth is 25 units; whereas without person C, the total
wealth is 30 units. So if our goal is to maximize society's
wealth, we are better off without person C. This logic is
analogous to the Nazi propaganda poster discussed
above. 21 This simple model, however, fails to take into
account the countless variables discussed below.
This is not a novel understanding of human value.
For example, in extremely poor societies where food is
scarce, the cost of feeding an elderly person may mean the
starvation of a child. In such a society, it is unremarkable
22that the elderly will be left to starve or even be murdered.
19 RICHARD A. POsNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, 203 (1995).
20 id.
21 See app. A.
22 POSNER, supra note 19, at 205. "Some 20 percent of primitive
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Moreover, it is not uncommon for the elderly in these
societies to acquiesce to society's death-to-the-elderly
norm and even go to their death merrily. 23 When resources
are extremely scarce, the death of one person often means
the continued life of another. Therefore, under dire
circumstances, calculating the value of each person's life is
inevitable.
A. Abortion as a Substitute
Empirical data tending to support or refute the
policy of euthanizing low quality lives is hard to come by.
Steven Levitt and John Donohue investigate the next best
thing in a paper entitled "The Impact of Legalized Abortion
on Crime. 24  According to their research, since 1991
homicide rates have dropped 40% with violent crime and
property crime each dropping more than 30%.25 Why?
Levitt and Donahue contend that the drop in crime is not
the result of more jails and better police, 26 but assert that it
societies" killed their old people. Id. at 203 n.4.
231d. at 203 (citing Lucy MAir, AFRICAN SOCIEES, 197 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1974)). It has become popular understanding that Eskimos
set adrift their elderly on ice floes to die, though there is some debate
as to how widespread this practice was. See Straight Dope, Science
Advisory Board, Did Eskimos put their elderly on ice floes to die?,
May 4, 2004,
http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/meskimoicefloe.html (last
visited Dec. 14, 2004) (clarifying that it was really the Yuits and Inuits
who engaged in this practice during times of famine).
24 John J. Donohue Ill & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime. (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. W8004, Nov. 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-249508
(last visited Sept. 10, 2005).25 Id. at 1.
26 Id. at 2.
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Levitt and Donahue argue that abortion helps lower
crime for two reasons. First, women who have abortions
are those most at risk to give birth to children who might
commit crime. 29 Studies show that while teenagers,
unmarried women, and the economically disadvantaged are
all more likely to have abortions, they are also more likely
to have children who are at higher risk for committing
crimes during adolescence.3 0  Second, legalized abortion
allows mothers "to delay childbearing if the current
conditions are suboptimal."' 31 This means children will be
born into better environments, thereby reducing future
criminality. 32  Drawing on this premise, Levitt and
Donahue conclude that crime in 1997 was 15-25% lower
than it would have been had abortion been illegal. 33
Although Levitt and Donahue's paper has been
criticized, 4 they provide an interesting argument for
terminating potentially low quality lives.3 5 It is one of the
few empirical studies that supports the contention that
27 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28 See Donohue & Levitt, supra note 24, at 2.




13 Id. at 34.
34 Randall K. O'Bannon & Laura Antkowiak, Abortion Link to Crime
Decreased Debunked,
http://www.nrlc.org/news/2001/NRL06/randylaura.html (last visited
Dec. 23, 2004) (discussing John Lott and John Whitley's reservations
about the statistical analysis in Levitt and Donahue's paper).
35 For the purposes of this paper, abortion is no different than
euthanizing a person outside the womb. The concept in the end is the
same-there are people who are potentially bad for society and society
would be better off if they were no longer around.
93
2:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 94
society can be made better, in at least one respect, if we
prevent certain "high risk" lives from coming into being.
Most people would agree that lower crime is a good thing.
It is not clear, however, whether society would truly
be better off without these high-propensity-for-crime
babies even if one accepts the notion that crime rates will
certainly be lowered. It is highly probable that many of
those who fall into the high-propensity-for-crime baby
category will not commit crimes, but will become
contributing members of society. It is not inconceivable
that an aborted child might have one day discovered the
cure for AIDS or cancer. To this end, Levitt and
Donohue's paper does nothing to prove that terminating
low quality lives will make society better. If accurate, it
only demonstrates that terminating low quality lives could
make society better.
B. Cost to Care for the Profoundly Mentally
Incapacitated
The cost to institutionalize the mentally disabled is
high. The state of California alone spends $600 million
annually.36 The annual cost to care for a resident in one
California state development center is just over $160,000.31
In Washington, D.C., the cost of providing services to the
36 Ed Pope, Bill Would Phase Out Centers for Retarded, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 23, 2001, available at http://www.psych-
health.com/dds30.htm.
37 Association of Regional Center Agencies, History of the
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mentally retarded and developmentally disabled averages
approximately $120,000 per year per resident.38 Of the
approximately six million mentally retarded individuals in
the United States, 39 roughly 10% are in institutions.
40
Even assuming the average cost for the institutional care of
one mentally disabled person in the United States is only
$50,000 per year, the total cost of institutionalization is an
astounding $30 billion per year. As for patients in a
permanent vegetative state (PVS), the number is slightly
less daunting. A survey of care costs for PVS patients in a
nursing facility suggested a range from $126,000 to
$180,000 per year per patient.41 Based on this, a rough
approximation of the total costs in the United States for the
care of adults and children in a permanent vegetative state
is around $4 billion.
42
38 D.C. Auditor, Cost of Care for the District's Mentally Retarded and
Developmentally Disabled Exceeded $300 Million Over a Three-Year
Period, (Dec. 18, 2000) http://www.dcwatch.com/auditor/audit030.htm
(last visited Dec. 14, 2004). And remember, this is the same area that
has been known to employ veterinarians instead of dentists. See supra,
note 9 and accompanying text. One can only imagine the cost if
patients were receiving proper care.39 Disability Statistics,
http://codi.buffalo.edu/graph_based/.demographics/.statistics (last
visited Dec. 14, 2004).
40 See Dr. Joseph F. Smith Medical Library, Mental Retardation,
http://www.chclibrary.org/micromed/00056550.btml (last visited Dec.
23, 2004).
41 Borthwick, supra note 17, at 170-171.
42 Id. It is important to note, however, that this figure is misleading.
Typically, a patient enters PVS after a long bout with some other
illness like dementia. The real cost is the difference between taking
care of a PVS patient versus taking care of a dementia patient.
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C. Some Philosophers in Favor of Euthanizing the
Profoundly Mentally Incapacitated
There may be moral issues which must be overcome
before society would be willing to start euthanizing those
who are considered "low quality." Thankfully,
philosophers and commentators have helped ease these
moral reservations.
Bruce Ackerman puts forward a conception of the
liberal theory of society.43 In this liberal society, a fetus is
not a citizen because it cannot participate in public
debate-going through a third party proxy does not count.
Ackerman's point focuses on political conversation and
participation in public discourse in which only some human
entities can participate. He states, "A liberal community
does not ask what a creature looks like before admitting it
to citizenship. Instead, it asks whether the creature can
play a part in the dialogic and behavioral transactions that
constitute a liberal policy. The fetus fails the dialogic
test-more plainly than do grown-up dolphins."
44
According to James Murray in his review of Ackerman's
book, "Ackerman's theory depends on the ability to assert
one's rights-a literal forensic aspect.",45  Murray also
argues that the "rights of the talking ape are more secure
than those of the human vegetable." 46  According to
Ackerman, citizenship has nothing to do with biology; it
43 See generally, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JuSTiCE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980).
44Id. at 127.
45 James R. Murray, Book Note, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 942, 955
(1983) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JusTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980)).
46 ACKERMAN, supra note 43, at 80.
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only has to do with politics. 47 Ackerman further contends
that those who cannot participate in the political process
are perhaps without protective rights. Thus, it relieves us
of the moral predicament of aborting fetuses and possibly
ending the lives of those that are profoundly mentally
incapacitated.48
Today's preeminent philosopher dealing with the
ethics of euthanasia is Peter Singer. Singer contends that
the quality of a living being's consciousness is what gives
its life value. The fact that a being is part of the species
Homo sapiens is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it;
"rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self
consciousness [make] the difference." 49  According to
Singer, because infants, regardless of whether they are
disabled, and the profoundly mentally incapacitated lack
these characteristics, killing them cannot be equated with
killing normal human beings or any other conscious being
for that matter.5 0  Singer explains that the difference
between killing a disabled infant and a normal infant does
not lie in the fact that the normal infant has the potential to
be a self-conscious living being, but rather in the attitudes
of the parent. The "reason why it is normally a terrible
thing to kill an infant is the effect the killing will have on
its parents., 51 The most plausible reason for attributing a
right to life to a being applies only if there is "some
awareness of oneself as a being existing over time, or as a
4 7
1d.
48 Confessedly, I do not fully understand Ackerman's SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LBERAL STATE. Its brief discussion is included because, from
what little I can gather, it seems relevant.
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continuing mental self."52  Because the profoundly
mentally incapacitated are by definition incapable of such
complex awareness, Singer sees no problem euthanizing
such individuals so long as there are no "extrinsic" reasons
for keeping them alive. This would include the emotional
anguish euthanasia would have on a PVS patient's loved
ones. Although it may still be wrong to kill a conscious
being that is not capable of rationality, autonomy, and self
consciousness if that being is likely to experience more
pleasure that pain,53 a PVS patient would likely not fall into
that category.5 4
Joseph Fletcher, a Protestant theologian and a
pioneer in the field of bioethics, has compiled a list of what
he calls "indicators of humanhood." The list includes: self
awareness, a sense of the future, a sense of the past, the
capacity to relate to others, concern for others,
communication, and curiosity. 55  Like Singer, Fletcher
argues that refusal "to approve of positively ending a
subhuman life",56 is absurd and that "mercy killing could be
52 Id. at 183. Singer wonders why it is morally wrong to kill, say, a PVS
patient but it is acceptable to kill a sentient animal. He says, "If we
compare a severely defective human infant with a nonhuman animal, a
dog or a pig, for example, we will often find the nonhuman to have
superior capacities, both actual and potential, for rationality, self-
consciousness, communication, and anything else that can plausibly be
considered morally significant." SINGER, supra note 10, at 201. Such
comparisons have made Peter Singer the target of much hatred. See,
e.g., Sylvia Nasar, Princeton's New Philosopher Draws a Stir, THE
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1999, at Al.
53 SINGER, supra note 49, at 101.
54 Singer asks if you would prefer an instant death or falling into a
coma for ten years followed by death. He suggests there is no reason
to pick the latter. See id. at 192.
55 Joseph Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of
Man, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1-3 (1972).
56 Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in To LIvE AND LET DIE:
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the right thing to do" in some circumstances where the
person to be killed is a "human vegetable, whether
spontaneously functioning or artificially supported." 
57
Included in the circumstances which would justify mercy
killing is the instance where one is considered
"progressively degraded while constantly eating up private
or public financial resources." 58 Fletcher has also argued
that if the life of a severely retarded baby can be ended
while still in the mother's womb through abortion, why can
it not be terminated just after birth? According to Fletcher,
The only difference between the fetus and
the infant is that the infant breathes with its
lungs. Does this make any significant
difference morally or from the point of view
of values? Surely not .... True guilt arises
only from an offense against a person, and
[an individual with Down's Syndrome] is
not a person. 59
By describing profoundly mentally incapacitated
individuals as subhuman, both Singer and Fletcher are able
to avoid moral impediments that stand in the way of
applying a strict utilitarian standard as to whether the
mentally incapacitated should live or die. Once the moral
hang-ups are out of the way, there is nothing stopping a
cost-benefit analysis of the lives of such afflicted
individuals. Because of this, it is not surprising that, for
Singer and Fletcher, the solution of euthanizing the
WHEN, WHY, AND How 116 (Robert H. Williams, ed., Springer-Verlag




59 Joseph Fletcher, The Right to Die: A Theologian Comments, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1968, at 62, 63-64.
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profoundly mentally incapacitated is an easy one, so long
as no one will miss them too much.
D. The "Life" and Death of Nancy Cruzan and
Terri Schiavo
In 1983, at the age of twenty-five, Nancy Cruzan
lost control of her car on a country road, was ejected, and
landed face down in a ditch filled with water. By the time
help arrived, she had been without oxygen for several
minutes. As a result, Nancy entered a persistent vegetative
state. Her brainstem remained sufficiently intact to keep
her body breathing without a respirator, but she could not
swallow. Food and water were fed to her through a tube
inserted into her nose running down to her stomach. Nancy
remained like this for eight years.
Nancy's parents, as her guardians, requested that
the hospital remove the feeding tube, which would lead to
Nancy's eventual death. The hospital refused, and
litigation began. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to
allow the removal of the feeding tube because Nancy was
not competent to refuse life-sustaining treatment herself.
60
The court could only give permission for the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment if there was clear and convincing
evidence that Nancy, while competent, would have wanted
life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn.6 1 So long as the
state was paying the tab for Nancy's care and the feeding
tube imposed no substantial burden, the legal presumption
remained "preserve life.",62  The Supreme Court of the
6°Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
6 1
id.
62 See id. at 419 ("The state's concern with the sanctity of life rests on
the principle that life is precious and worthy of preservation without
regard to its quality. This latter concern is especially important when
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United States granted certiorari and affirmed the Missouri
Supreme Court holding that each state can make its own
decision as to what should happen when an incompetent
person has not previously expressed her desire to refuse
treatment. 6 3 In reaching its decision, the Court accepted
the right of the state of Missouri to demand clear and
convincing evidence that it was what Nancy would have
wanted.
Nancy died a few months after the Supreme Court
decision was handed down when her feeding tube was
finally removed. In the end, it was removed after former
friends came out of the woodwork to say they remembered
Nancy had indicated to them that she wished to die if she
was ever in such a situation. This time the state of
Missouri allowed the feeding tube to be removed.64
What is the point? For seven of the eight years, it
was clear the Nancy would never emerge from her
vegetative state. The state of Missouri was paying
$130,000 a year to keep Nancy's body breathing.
Moreover, her parents were under extreme strain, as they
believed their daughter had died the day of the car crash.65
During the media frenzy that surrounded the case, Nancy's
father said, "It isn't my daughter (at the hospital). My
daughter's been gone for over 6 1/2 years and that is just
what is left of her."66  On a nationally televised news
considering a person who has lost the ability to direct her medical
treatment.").63 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
64 For an excellent account of Cruzan's story, see RICHARD EPSTEIN,
MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE, 347-49
(Addison-Wesley 1997); SINGER, supra note 10, at 60-63.
65 On Nancy's tombstone, the family engraved: Nancy Beth Cruzan -
Born July 20, 1957 - Departed Jan 11, 1983 - At Peace Dec 26, 1990.
See SINGER, supra note 10, at 62.
66 Robert Steinbrook, High Court to Rule on Halting Treatment:
101
2:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 102
program, he stated, "My daughter died six years ago and
the state will not let us have a funeral." 67 No one wanted
Nancy's body to continue breathing indefinitely in a
permanent vegetative state except for the state of Missouri.
Just last year, the courts were called in again to
settle the fate of another woman in a permanent vegetative
state. This time the woman was Terri Schiavo and the facts
of the case were strikingly similar to those of the Nancy
Cruzan case. Terri was a young woman who, through an
unsettled accident, had oxygen cut off to her brain for a
prolonged period. Afterwards, the doctors rendered her
profoundly mentally incapacitated-a shadow of her
former self. Terri was somewhat more "alert" than Nancy.
Terri, unlike Nancy, was capable of breathing and
maintaining blood pressure, but still required a feeding tube
connected to her stomach to sustain life. Yet, the
similarities ended there.
No one but the state of Missouri wished to keep
Nancy alive in such a state. In the case of Terri, however,
her family fought to keep her alive, while her husband
fought to have the feeding tube removed.68 Because Terri
did not have a living will, 69 the case centered on who
should be able to decide Terri's fate: her husband, who
was her legal guardian, or her family.
For the purposes of this comment, the normative
Family's Rights at Heart of 'Right to Die' Question, L.A. TIMES, July
29, 1989, at 1.
67 CNBC Live (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 31, 1989).
68 See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378
(M.D. Fla. 2005). Ultimately, Terr's parents petitioned the Supreme
Court but were denied relief. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo,
125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005).
69 The Schiavo case made people much more focused on the subject of
advanced directives, living wills, and estate planning in general. See
Tom Mighell, Estate Planning On The Web, 68 TEX. B.J. 384 (2005).
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question of who should decide the fate of someone who is
profoundly mentally incapacitated is irrelevant. The
interesting aspect of the Schiavo case is that her family
gained some utility from Terri's life, even though Terri no
longer could. This provides a much different situation than
Nancy's case where her family, friends, and husband
collectively wished to end her life. Terri's case is much
more difficult from an expected utility position. An
argument can be made that it is possible that the negative
utility experienced by her husband in having Terri hooked
up to the feeding tube was outweighed by the positive
utility experienced by her parents. Of course, no one will
ever know.
According to Richard Epstein, sustaining the life of
someone who is profoundly mentally incapacitated serves
no purpose. "The maxim, preserve life, only makes sense
when the expected utility of that life to the holder of that
life is positive., 70 The rule of continued treatment could
make sense when the powerful could take advantage of the
helpless. An example of this is when children take care of
their elderly parents. Epstein argues that the permanent
vegetative state is so different from all other ailments and
so irreversible, that it falls into a separate category of its
own. "A rule that said 'allow death in a permanent
vegetative state' could easily be adopted without sliding
down some slippery slope, so close is the permanent
vegetative state to clinical death., 71 "Choose life" makes
little sense when there is so little for which to live.
V. Rationale Against Terminating Low Quality Lives
7 0 EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 348-49 (emphasis in original).
71 id.
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A. A Law and Economics Rationale
Compelling law and economics arguments exist
against allowing doctors to perform euthanasia-voluntary
or not. The Hippocratic Oath, which all physicians accept,
requires doctors to "neither give a deadly drug to anybody
who asked for it, nor . . . make a suggestion to this
effect." 72 The Hippocratic Oath makes economic sense, as
it ostensibly guarantees that doctors will act as faithful
agents of the patient's interest. If a patient is willing to pay
up to $50 for an educated diagnosis, but is fearful the
doctor may prescribe unnecessary surgery, a bargain may
not be reached even if the doctor offers his services for less
than $50. This is where the Hippocratic Oath comes in.
Physicians get more business because sick people will be
less inclined to practice home remedies or seek out quacks.
In turn, patients will receive better care because they will
be treated by medical experts. "Both physicians and
patients would be better off if patients could place a high
degree of trust in their doctors because the absence of such
trust will prevent many mutually beneficial bargains from
being reached.,
73
Giving patients the well-informed option to accept
euthanasia does not alleviate all the aforementioned
problems. Patients will still need to take costly precautions
against doctors. Patients will still require protection from
family members who can pressure the sick and dying into
an early demise so that economic costs, such as costly
medicine, can be lowered and financial gains, such as
72 Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation, and
Interpretation 3 (Henry E. Sigerist ed., John Hopkins Press 1943).
73 See Nelson Lund, Two Precipices, One Chasm: The Economics Of
Physician-Assisted Suicide And Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
903, 907-08 (1997).
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insurance policies, realized. Even if it is solely the
patient's choice, doctors are experts in framing options to
guarantee certain outcomes. Imagine being confronted
with the question of "agonizing death" versus "gentle quick
release." Because of this, the argument goes, the practice
of physician-assisted suicide erodes the trust that patients
give doctors and, therefore, increases costs. Many argue
that this is not simply "a moral nicety," but rather a
valuable device for reducing agency costs by diminishing
the need for patients to take costly steps to monitor their
doctors to ensure they are acting in the patient's best
interest. 
74
While the above argument may apply to those that
are still conscious or have a glimmer of hope of one day
becoming conscious, it is not clear whether it extends to
those in a permanent vegetative state or those that are
profoundly mentally disabled. Nelson Lund argues that
once physicians begin assisting in "mercy killings" of those
competent to give consent, it will become unbearably
tempting for physicians to euthanize the most
"dehumanized., 75  Here Lund's argument goes awry
because his leap from the practice of voluntary euthanasia
to the practice of non-voluntary euthanasia is shaky. He
appeals only to human nature by claiming that doctors
simply will not be able to control themselves.
Epstein argues that "state intervention must be used
to preserve lives known to be worth living," but that "when
life is hopeless or inert, the guardian [should have] the
right, to see that the life ends; and if active euthanasia is the
best means to achieve that end, so be it." 76  When a
patient's prognosis is unclear, imperfect utilitarian
74 See id. at 935.751 d. at 919.
76 EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 358.
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judgments are inescapable and the patient must be
protected. But when there is no hope of recovery, the lives
of those "haunted by pain of doomed to eerie silence"
should not be preserved so long as the patient's guardian
does not object.77 Lund contends that the guardians should
never have the right to pull the plug no matter how bleak
the prognosis. Therefore, Lund takes issue with Epstein's
argument as well.
B. Accuracy of Assessment Problems
But why not euthanize the PVS patient who, by
definition, has no hope of recovery? For one reason, there
could to be an accuracy problem in the assessment of those
who truly are in a permanent vegetative state, as people
who have been diagnosed as PVS sometimes "come back
to life."
Carrie Coons, an eighty-six year-old woman entered
a hospital after a massive stroke. Initially able to speak, she
quickly deteriorated into what was diagnosed as PVS.
Coons's sister maintained that Coons would not wish to be
kept in this condition and petitioned the court to remove the
feeding tube. The court accepted this wish and allowed the
hospital to remove the tube. 78  Before the tube was
removed, however, Coons woke up and began eating and
speaking. This case illustrates both the imprecision of
medical judgment and the dangers inherent in allocating the
choice of life or death to family members. Apparently
people sometimes come out of a seemingly permanent
77 Id. Ignoring the thorny issue of guardianship, this is in stark contrast
to the Schiavo case where her parents emphatically wished to keep her
alive.
78 In re Gannon, No. 0189-017460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14, 1989).
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vegetative state. 79
Even more frightening is the possibility that PVS
patients are actually awake on the inside even though they
appear dead to the world. An accuracy problem would also
arise in being able to assess what it is like to be in a
permanent vegetative state. Some claim that patients in a
permanent vegetative state often experience periods of
wakefulness. Evidence shows that some patients who
appear to be unconscious for extended periods of time and
unresponsive to external stimuli report, upon recovery, that
they had in fact been conscious even though they were
incapable of showing any signs of awareness. 81 When the
feeding tubes are removed from a PVS patient who is able
to breathe on his own, he starves to death over a period of
days-a terrifying thought if the patient is awake on the
inside, but unable to scream for help.
Further, studies show that happiness is relative.
From the perspective of being healthy and normal, it is easy
to pity those with severe ailments and question why they
would want to live. But it is clear that people with Down's
syndrome, for example, are capable of experiencing more
pleasure than pain. In a 1978 study of the happiness of
severe accident victims and lottery winners, researchers
79 See, e.g., Harvey S. Levin et al., Vegetative State After Closed Head-
Injury: A Traumatic Coma Data Bank Report, 48 ARCHIvEs OF
NEUROLOGY 580 (1991) ("Of 84 patients in the vegetative state who
provided follow-up data, 41% became conscious by 6 months, 52%
regained consciousness by 1 year, and 58% recovered consciousness
within the 3 year follow-up interval.") Id. at 584.
8° Lund, supra note 73, at 940-41 (citing Marcia Angell, After Quinlan:
The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1524, 1525 (1994)).
81id.
82 SINGER, supra note 49, at 187 ("Down's Syndrome is [not] so
crippling as to make life not worth living.") Id.
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found that paraplegics adapt better than most would
expect. 83 The immediate effect of becoming physically
challenged was extreme unhappiness and the immediate
effect of winning the lottery was extreme joy. After several
years, however, the happiness rates leveled off to
essentially the pre-accident and pre-winning-the-lottery
happiness levels. 84  "Perhaps people, through coping
mechanisms, are able to adapt to disease better than they
anticipated in advance." 85 Because of this, policy-makers
will likely fail to predict the utility of those they deem to
have a low quality life. Thus, line-drawing errors are
inescapable.
C. Intuitions and Biological Reasons Behind the
Sanctity Of Life
Judge Richard Posner argues that, for better or
worse, we have unshakable intuitions about the sanctity of
human life. Posner writes, "These intuitions precede and
inform, rather than following and being informed by,
philosophical analysis of personhood. ' ,86 For some reason,
we have intuitions that infanticide, enforcing suicide
contracts, and euthanizing the profoundly mentally disabled
are wrong. Posner claims that these intuitions stand or fall
on "whether a monkey or a computer should be deemed
more of a person than a severely demented or profoundly
83 Phillip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 917
(1978).
4 Id.
"Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law And Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1542 (1998).
86 POSNER, supra note 19, at 257.
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retarded human being." 87 Accordingly, we will make no
progress because of our immovable intuitions concerning
the "priority of human beings over machines and
animals."88  "At the bottom we test our theories by
reference to our intuitions, the things we cannot help
believing."
8 9
One possible reason for valuing all human life is
that humans gain pleasure from being part of a society that
takes care of its disadvantaged people. During times of
scarcity, primitive humans were forced to kill or let the
weakest members of their community die.9° Consequently,
only the wealthiest communities were capable of ensuring
that their sick and elderly survived the scarce times. The
weakest members acted as a buffer. Surely the
communities might have more food or resources without
the sick, elderly, or disabled, but without them, the healthy
would be the next to go. Evolutionarily, humans may gain
pleasure from being part of a society that is able to
maintain its sick and disabled. It is a survival instinct.
This may explain our "objective moral view of our
obligation to cherish, preserve, and protect even the most
humble examples of [human life]." Intuition can be a
powerful guide in answering ethical questions.
Further, euthanizing humans deemed to be of low
quality may be a problem for the risk averse. A possible
objection to this form of euthanasia is that it would lead to




89 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 340 (1990).
90 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
91 Scott Pruett, Personhood: The Measure of Life, available at
http://www.lifeway.com/lwc/articlemain_page/0, 1703,A%253D 15622
3%2526M%253D200166,00.html (discussing Singers position).
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might, come within its scope. 92 As mentioned above,
patients would become ever vigilant of their doctors as they
became infirmed-always afraid that the next injection or
pill would be the last.
D. Incommensurability and the Cost of Costing
Hidden within the rational economic choice to
euthanize those individuals deemed low quality is the harm
from the comparison of incommensurable goods, or what
Calabresi and Bobbitt have called "the costs of 
costing." 93
Incommensurability occurs when aligning goods along a
single metric offends our judgment about how these goods
should be characterized. The single metric is, of course,
usually money. Using the market to determine the price of
certain things causes an affront to our values, for example,
"of market determinations that say or imply that the value
of a life or of some precious activity integral to life is
reducible to a money figure." 94 Calabresi and Bobbit use
the example of slavery noting that "[t]he social costs of
indentured labor . . . surely includes one's outrage at
inducing the poor to sell themselves, and this cost must be
considered before the society allows peonage."
95
So even if we are prepared to engage in the
dialogue of whose life is worthless and begin the
calculations to determine who should be euthanized, it
seems that we will fail to arrive at the correct valuation.
First, certain variables will be left out of the equation
altogether because pricing incommensurable goods causes
92 SINGER, supra note 49, at 192.
93 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHiLIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 32
(Norton & Co. 1978).
94Id.
9' Id. at 33.
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immediate "violence to our considered judgments,"
"affront to values," and societal outrage. 96 Second, even if
we attempt to measure these missing variables, some are
incapable of sufficiently precise calculation. "Attempts to
weigh precisely the social costs and benefits associated
with different responses to a tragic choice result more often
in the valuation of only what we can measure than in the
measurement of all that we can value."
97
When the decision to euthanize low quality lives is
made, there is still another variable that must be calculated.
"[O]ur lives and institutions depend on the notion that life
is beyond price." 98 A refusal to save lives or an affirmative
choice to end lives is horribly costly. For example, life
insurance policies are routinely taken out on coal miners
for several hundred thousand dollars; but when the mine
collapses, the authorities are willing to spend millions to
save a single miner.99 Being able to hold on to the ideal
that all life is priceless, in itself, has value. Even if the
decision to terminate a low quality life would be cost
effective in the short run, it almost certainly will not be in
the long run.
V. Conclusion
96Id. at 204 n.15 ("Costs which are difficult to measure, such as the
affront to the value of human life entailed by a decision to authorize
medical experimentation with the terminally ill, will often be left out of
the accounting altogether, though the resulting narrowness of the
premises will poison the conclusion."). See also Laurence H. Tribe,
Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
97 See CALABREsI & BOBBrr, supra note 93, at 204.
98 Id. at 39.
99 See id. ("A fortune may be spent to save a convict caught in a
jailhouse fire.")
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On its face, the notion of euthanizing society's
weakest and most unproductive individuals appears to
make strict economic sense. Once other factors are
introduced, however, not only does it become clear that
such a policy does not make economic sense, but also that
it is a notion we do not even want to entertain. As for those
individuals in a permanent vegetative state, the rationale
for not terminating their lives does not fit as nicely. As
Peter Singer, Richard Epstein, and others have argued,
there seems to be no difference between dying and being in
a permanent vegetative state. Perhaps the issue lies with
revamping the clinical definition of "death," which some
doctors have proposed should encompass people who are in
a permanent vegetative state.
100
'0o Dr. Marcia Angell, Executive Editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, has proposed that death should be redefined to include
permanent vegetative states and that food should be withheld from the
"dead" person until the heart and lungs stop. See Marcia Angell, After
Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1524 (1994).
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lmites der 11SOD
Poster reads: "This person suffering from hereditary defects
costs the people 60,000 Reichmarks during his lifetime.
People, that is your money."
101 Wikipedia Encyclopedia, T-4 Euthanasia Program, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:EnthanasiePropaganda.jpg (last
visited Dec. 23, 2004).
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A FIGHT 'TILL THE DEATH:




In the spring of 2005, the United States Congress
passed An Act for the Relief for the Parents of Theresa
Marie Schiavo1 ("the Act") in response to numerous
requests by Michael Schiavo, Theresa's husband, to have
Theresa's feeding tube removed. Michael Schiavo argued
that, prior to her accident, Theresa ("Terri") made oral
statements expressing her wish not to be kept alive in a
persistent vegetative state.2 The Act provided a mechanism
for the parents of Terri Schiavo to institute legal
proceedings to prevent the removal of Terri's feeding
tube.
3
Despite its numerous backers, many advocates of a
patient's right to make end-of-life decisions perceive the
Act as a step backwards. The Act negates Michael
Schiavo's ability, as the surrogate decision-maker for Terri,
to make the decision to withhold or withdraw food that is
necessary to sustain her major life functions. While
Michael Schiavo claims that he has empirical evidence that
Terri did not want to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative
state, the Act precludes him from fulfilling Terri's wishes
'An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
2 In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
3 See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo §
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without the threat of a lawsuit by Terri's parents.4
Furthermore, the Act prevents Michael Schiavo from
complying with the holding of the court in In re Schiavo. 
5
In that case, the Florida District Court of Appeals refused
to grant Terri's parents relief from a trial court judgment
holding that, based on clear and convincing evidence, Terri
was in a persistent vegetative state and would have decided
to forego further use of a feeding tube. 6 While the court
ordered the feeding tube be removed under the Act,
Michael Schiavo could not comply with the court order
without the possibility of a lawsuit by Terri's parents.7
In this note, I will first provide a brief summary of
the government's treatment of end-of-life decision-making
and how that treatment assisted in the development of the
Act. Then, I will examine the Act as it relates to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Next, I will examine Congress's interest in this case,
showing that Congress had neither a compelling interest to
interfere with the state court's order nor a compelling
interest in passing legislation to limit the rights of Michael
Schiavo. in his capacity as surrogate decision-maker for
Terri, to fulfill Tern's wishes. Finally, I will examine the
separation of powers requirements and show that
Congress's interference in this matter was a clear
constitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine




5 In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 814.
6 See id.
7 See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Schiavo § 2.
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I. Development of an Act for Relief for the Parents of
Terri Schiavo
A. Historical Perspective on End-of-Life Decision
Making
The history of an individual's right to autonomy
and self-determination is derived from several sources
including the United States Constitution 8 and state
constitutional provisions. 9 While these rights may seem to
strike a cord in the court of public opinion, no court of law
has ever held that these rights are absolute.
The patient's right to choose whether to receive
medical treatment is an issue that has been debated for
many years. Although some court opinions express the
view that a citizen has the "right to be let alone,"'10 most
early refusals of medical treatment were disregarded, and
patients were forced to undergo treatment.11
The right to refuse treatment was debated for
decades in cases concerning competent patients who sought
to refuse medical treatment. 12  In most of those cases,
8 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262
(1990) (holding that a person has a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
9 See, e.g., id; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
" See, e.g., Jacobson v. Mass, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that the
protection of the public trumped the individual's right to refuse medical
treatment when a patient refuses a smallpox vaccination shot).
12 See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1002-03 (1964)
(balancing the legal rights and responsibilities of the hospital and its
agents on one hand and the patient and her husband on the other).
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however, the courts denied the competent person's attempt
to refuse treatment. 13  It was not until the question of
withholding or withdrawing treatment was raised on behalf
of incompetent patients that the courts began to recognize
such a right in all patients. 14  Regarding incompetent
patients, courts rationalized that incompetent patients
should not lose their rights to autonomy and self-
determination merely because they lack competency.'
5
Those patients who are incompetent have the same
decision-making rights as those who are competent, but
they need another to assist them in making such end-of-life
decisions. 16 Once the right was recognized in incompetent
patients, courts became more willing to recognize the right
of competent patients to refuse treatment as well.
Ironically, it was not until the United States Supreme Court
heard a case involving the scope of end-of-life decision-
making for an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative
state17 that the Court addressed the issue as it relates to
competent patients.
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In
re Quinlan, which became the land-mark case addressing
the rights of patients in persistent vegetative states. 18 In In
re Quinlan, a young woman was in a persistent vegetative
13 See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11.
14 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
'5 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977).
1
6 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985) (stating that the
court has a special responsibility to place appropriate constraints on
private decision making and to create guideposts that will help protect
people's interests in determining the course of their own lives);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
17 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
1
8 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
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state and her breathing was assisted by a ventilator. 19 Her
father sought appointment as her guardian in order to
discontinue all extraordinary medical procedures sustaining
his daughter's life.20 The New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized that the incompetent patient had the right to
have a guardian exercise for her the same decisions she
could have made if competent and able to make them for
herself.2 1 According to the court, her guardian's power to
22do this was not unconditional. Before he could request
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, however, his
daughter's physicians had to conclude that there was no
reasonable possibility that she would ever emerge from the
vegetative state and regain her full cognitive abilities.23
The debate over withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration has been far-reaching. For many individuals,
artificial nutrition and hydration administered through a
feeding tube is another form of medical treatment, similar
to breathing through a ventilation system. However,
artificial nutrition and hydration bears little resemblance to
eating and drinking naturally. The procedure is invasive to
the patient's body, and most foods must be liquefied before
they are inserted into the feeding tube. There is also debate
over whether patients in persistent vegetative states suffer
pain associated with the removal of the feeding tube.
24
When it comes to the removal of a feeding tube, most
courts addressing the issue have held that a competent
19 1d. at 647.
20 d. at 651.
21 Id. at 663.
221d. at 671.
231Id. at 671-72.
24 See Jeff M. Sellers, When to Pull a Feeding Tube, CHRISTiANrrY
TODAY, May 2005, available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2OO5/OO5/9.48. html.
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person, or a surrogate acting for an incompetent person, can
order the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration.25 Some courts, however, have held the
contrary, especially in cases involving incompetent
patients. 26
The next significant case addressing a patient's
right to refuse medical treatment was Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.27 In Cruzan, the patient
was in a persistent vegetative state as a result of a car
accident. 28 Before her accident, she had made statements
to her roommate indicating that she "would not wish to
continue her life unless she could live at least halfway
normally." 29  The issue in Cruzan was whether the
Missouri standard requiring clear and convincing evidence
of a patient's wishes before withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment violated the patient's due process rights.30 The
Supreme Court held that it did not.31 The Court indicated
that the question of whether a constitutional right has been
violated must be determined by balancing an individual's
liberty interest against the relevant state interests. 32 The
25 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (R.I. 1988) (holding
that if an incompetent patient, when competent, would have made the
decision to refuse nutrition and hydration, a guardian ad litem may
make the decision to refuse nutrition and hydration for that now
incompetent patient).26 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988), arid,
497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the decision to refuse medical
treatment must be an informed decision and in order to be informed,
the patient must have capacity).27Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
2 8 ld. at 265.
29Id. at 268.
' 0 Id. at 262.
31 Id. at 285.
32 Id. at 279 (quoting Youngbanks v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982)).
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Court assumed that competent patients possess a liberty
interest in ordering that medical treatment be withheld or
withdrawn. 33 The Court stated that it does not, however,
violate equal protection principles to deny substitute
decision-making to incompetent patients because, unlike
competent patients, they are not able to make end-of-life
decisions. 34 The Court further stated that it is a patient's
ability to hear and understand information and make
decisions knowingly and voluntarily that distinguishes the
competent patient from the incompetent patient.
35
While many believed that the Cruzan decision
would hinder the right of incompetent patients to have
others make treatment decisions for them, it does not seem
to have had this effect. Although the Court held that the
standard of clear and convincing evidence did not violate
the constitutional rights of the patient, the Court did not
mandate that all states adopt that burden of proof when
allowing a surrogate to make decisions for an incompetent
patient. State legislators are free to enact legislation that
protects incompetent patients' rights to have others make
end-of-life decisions for them. As a result of Cruzan and
its predecessors, most states have enacted statutes
governing the end-of-life decision making process for
incompetent patients. 36  These statutes may specify the
types of medical treatment that may be refused and may
separate and draw distinctions between artificial
ventilation, artificial nutrition, artificial hydration, surgery,
kidney dialysis, and medication.37  Some statutes may
33 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.341d. at 287.
31 Id. at 279-80, 287.
36 See, e.g., TEN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5) (West 2005); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.201-765.205, 765.301-765.305 (West 2005).37See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5).
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permit nutrition and hydration to be withheld, but only
when certain standards are met. 38
Florida, the state where Michael and Terri Schiavo
resided, deals with the subject of end-of-life decision
making for incompetent patients in its statutory law. For
example, § 765.305 of the Florida Statutes Annotated states
that, in the absence of a living will, a health care surrogate,
i.e. a person appointed to make the decisions for another,
39
is charged with deciding to withdraw or withhold life-
prolonging procedures unless the designation limits the
surrogate's authority. Absent any limitation from the
patient pertaining to the surrogate's authority to make
decisions for the patient, the only statutory limitations on
the surrogate's authority to withdraw life-prolonging
procedures are: (1) that the surrogate be satisfied that the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state, and (2) that the
patient lacks a reasonable medical probability of recovering
so that the right to decide may be exercised by the patient.
Legislators and courts are rarely faced with
scenarios where family members disagree on whether life-
prolonging procedures should be withdrawn. The parents
of Terri Schiavo had engaged in a legal battle to prevent
the removal of Terri's feeding tube. That legal battle ended
on March 16, 2005 when the Florida District Court of
Appeals upheld the Florida statute concerning a surrogate's
decision-making power to remove an incompetent person's
feeding tube. 41 Five days later, on March 21, 2005, the
United States Congress passed An Act for the Relief of the
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.
42
3s See id.
39 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1458 (7th ed. 1999).
4 0 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.305 (West 2005).
41 In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
42 An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.
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I. Due Process: A Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution forbids the government from depriving an
individual of life or liberty without due process of the
law.43  In the more than two hundred years since the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the government has
taken an interest in ensuring that every citizen is provided
due process of law when engaged in legal proceedings.
The Fourteenth Amendment further provides citizens with
protection from any law which abridges the privileges or
immunities of the several states. The Fourteenth
Amendment also affords all citizens equal protection of the
laws.44 If a patient's interest in self-determination and
autonomy are founded on fundamental constitutional
principles, the government must demonstrate that it has a
compelling interest in overriding the patient's right to
refuse treatment, and that the means of enforcing its
interest is the least restrictive of the available
alternatives. 45 The Supreme Court has held that, even if a
patient's decision-making interest is not based on a
fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the
government's restriction of that interest must satisfy a
rational basis test.
46
4 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
44Id
45 In some cases, the Supreme Court has departed from the application
of a specific standard and has employed a test that balances the
interests of the state with those of the individual and evaluates the
weight of the obstacle the state has imposed upon the citizen's exercise
of the right at issue. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
46 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-03 (1993).
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IV. The Government's Compelling Interest
Courts have traditionally recognized four interests
sufficient to override a patient's right to self-determination:
(1) preserving life; (2) protecting the interests of innocent
third persons; (3) preventing suicide; and (4) protecting the
integrity of the medical profession. 
4 7
A. Preserving Life
The government's interest in preserving life focuses
not on the life of any one individual, but rather on the value
of every person's life to society as a whole. It is an interest
based on the sanctity of life and on every individual's
dignity and worth.48 If the government's interest in
preserving life were found to override Terri's right to self-
determination, the right to self-determination would be
rendered meaningless. If Congress's interest in preserving
the life of an incompetent patient is based on that
individual's dignity, then Congress cannot, in good faith,
deny Terri her right to autonomy. Moreover, if there is
clear and convincing evidence that Terri did not want to
live in a persistent vegetative state, as the court in In re
Schiavo found,49 the state should carry out her wishes.
Thus, if the government's interest is in the sanctity of life
and the individual's dignity, that interest must be honored
47 See Satz v. Perlnutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (1978); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 425.
48 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220 (stating that all persons
have a fundamental right to expect that their lives will not be
foreshortened against their will).49In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 814.
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when the individual, facing a prolonged, painful death or
the indignity of having to be cared for by others, decides to
refuse further medical care.
The assertion that the government has a
fundamental interest in the sanctity of life may be attacked
on the ground that many states have a death penalty
designed to end the lives of those persons deemed culpable
of egregious crimes. Likewise, for those who are sick or
have various other injuries, the government's interest in
preserving their lives is hardly absolute because the
government does not guarantee health care for its citizens.
In Terri's case, the state kept her alive, against clear and
convincing evidence that she did not want to live in a
persistent vegetative state. Terri was neither honored nor
afforded dignity by the government's decision to keep her
alive against clear evidence that she would have objected to
such treatment.
In the 1970s, courts began to allow an individual's
right to self-determination to override the government's
interest in preserving life. 50 The individual's right to have
life-prolonging treatment removed or withheld was initially
recognized in cases where the invasion of the patient's
body by the treatment was great and the patient's
prognosis, even with treatment, was not favorable.
51
Today, however, it is unlikely that a court would deny a
patient's request to refuse treatment on the basis of the
government's interest in preserving life, even if the
50 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987) (holding
that an individual's right to chart his or her own plan of medical
treatment deserves as much, if not more, constitutionally protected
privacy than does an individual's home or automobile).
5' See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (relying on the fact that
experts did not think the patient would survive with treatment and that
the patient would certainly die without the treatment).
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treatment in question was commonplace. 52
In Terri's case, the court held that Terri's wishes
should be honored. Congress then attempted to
circumvent the court's ruling through the Act, which
granted Terri's parents standing to bring suit against
Michael Schiavo, Terri's surrogate decision-maker, if he
complied with the court order. 54 Here, Congress did not
show a compelling interest in the sanctity of life. Congress
simply attempted to wield its authority in this area by
overriding the state's authority. The Act did not address all
residents similarly situated to Terri's condition; it only
focused on Terri Schiavo.55 For this reason, the Act does
not show a compelling state interest in the sanctity of life.
B. Protecting Interests of Third Parties
Courts have traditionally recognized that
governmental interest in protecting the interests of innocent
third persons is sufficient to override an individual's right
to self-determination. In In re Georgetown College, the
court allowed the state's interest in protecting innocent
third parties to override the decision of a Jehovah's
Witness patient to refuse to undergo a blood transfusion
because she was the mother of a minor child. 56 Recently,
however, courts have allowed adults to refuse life-saving or
52 The results could be different if the patient wanted to take active
steps, or have another person take active steps, to end the patient's life.
In the case of assisted-suicide or active euthanasia, however, the state's
interest in preserving life could prevail over the patient's interest in
autonomous decision-making.
53 See In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
54 See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.
" See id.
56 In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1009-10.
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life-sustaining treatment even if the refusal would mean
death, and would result in the dying patient leaving behind
minor children. 57 These cases mainly have pertained to
competent adult patients. For example, in St. Mary's
Hospital v. Ramsey, the court upheld the right of a 27-year
old Jehovah's Witness patient with one minor child to
refuse the administration of blood products. 58
If an innocent third party exists in Terri's case, that
party would be her parents. However, her parents were not
dependents and did not rely on her financially, as a minor
child would rely on a parent. Instead, Terri's parents were
seeking guardianship of Terri.59 If her parents had gained
custody of her, then Terri would have been dependent upon
them. Thus, Terri's parents would not have a claim of
abandonment as would a child whose parent chooses not to
accept life-prolonging treatment. Additionally, the court
rulings pertaining to this governmental interest have
involved competent patients. Because Terri was in a
persistent vegetative state, she was an incompetent patient.
For these reasons, the government's interest in protecting
an innocent third party fails in the case of Terri Schiavo.
C. Preventing Suicide
The government has historically recognized an
interest in preventing its citizens from committing
suicide. 60 This interest coincides with the state's interest in
the preservation of life for all its citizens, both collectively
"7 See, e.g., St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that although there is a minor
daughter, this case is difficult to categorize as abandonment).
18 See id.
591n re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
60 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209.
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and individually. The government's interest is relevant
here because a patient's decision to withdraw or withhold
life-prolonging treatment will lead to the patient's death,
which will occur earlier in time than if the treatment had
been continued.
For many years, courts have allowed the refusal or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, despite the
government's interest in preventing suicide. These courts
have asserted that the patient's death was not caused by the
refusal or withdrawal of treatment, but rather by the
patient's underlying medical condition. 6 1  Courts have
distinguished the withdrawal of treatment from suicide on
the grounds that the patient's condition leading to the
treatment was not self-inflicted and the patient's intent in
refusing treatment was not to die. Rather, the intent was
not to continue to live under the present conditions.
62
Some courts have also expressed the opinion that
withdrawal of treatment was not an action, but an omission
and, therefore, could not be characterized as suicide. 
63
Terri's expressed wish to refuse treatment cannot be
characterized as suicide. The removal of nutrition here is
not a self-inflicted procedure aimed at ending her life. It is,
rather, the omission of measures that would prolong Terri's
life in a state in which she expressly did not want to live.
This case, as courts have previously held,64  is
61 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1219 (holding that patient would
have died within one year even with the treatment); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 417.
62 See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So.2d. at 163 (holding that because the
patient did not self-inflict his condition, the refusal of treatment cannot
be characterized as suicide).
63 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997) (distinguishing
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distinguishable from suicide because Terri did not express
a will to refuse treatment in order to end her life. She
expressed a desire to refuse treatment when she could not
live in a normal state. This is fundamentally different from
suicide because Terri's intent was not to end her life per se,
but to end prolonged survival in a persistent vegetative
state.
The government's interest in preventing suicide has
resurfaced in the assisted-suicide debate. The supporters of
assisted-suicide argue that, in many respects, those cases
are indistinguishable from withdrawal of treatment cases.
According to assisted-suicide proponents, there is no
difference between withdrawing treatment that results in
one's death and providing a means for one to die earlier
than would be expected from a terminal or chronic
condition. Assisted-suicide supporters do not necessarily
argue that withdrawal of treatment is not suicide, but rather
that, if a patient is allowed to hasten death through
withdrawal, the patient should be allowed to achieve the
same end through other means.65  If the government's
interest in preventing suicide is not compelling enough to
override a patient's interest in refusing treatment, it also
should not be compelling enough to override the patient's
interest in shortening his or her life by other means.
Patients should not be forced to die from infection or from
lack of ventilation, nutrition, or hydration, rather than from
a quicker, more effective method. Additionally,
proponents of assisted-suicide argue that withdrawal of
treatment is also an act rather than an omission. Even if
withdrawal of treatment is an omission, the law imposes
culpability for negative omissions as well as for positive
65 See, e.g., Quill, 521 U.S. at 807 (overruling the lower court's
assumption that individuals have a right to hasten death).
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acts.66 Those opposed to assisted-suicide fail to recognize
a patient's constitutional right to autonomy. 6 7  Terri's
decision to refuse life-prolonging treatment is not a fight
that she should have to win in the court of public opinion,
because one goal of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is to provide every citizen with
autonomy. 68 For these reasons, the government cannot
sustain an interest in preventing Terri's husband from
removing her feeding tube because his goal was not to help
her commit suicide, but simply to ensure that she would not
be forced to live in a permanent vegetative state.
D. Maintaining Integrity in the Medical
Profession
Another governmental interest offered in opposition
to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is the need to
maintain integrity in the medical profession. Although this
interest is frequently cited, it is rarely persuasive.
69
Members of the medical profession would argue that it is
the role of health care providers to save lives, not take
them, and that providers must have the freedom to treat
patients according to their reasonable professional
judgment. 70 Health care providers would further argue that
withholding or withdrawing treatment that results in the
66 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 647 (stating that although there
are medical advances, justice will have to keep up with them).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So.2d at 163-64 (quoting Saikewicz, 370
N.E. 2d at 426-27).
70 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 668 (speaking of the need not
to inhibit the "independent medical judgments" of physicians "in the
pursuit of their healing vocation").
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death of a patient may well violate their ethical code, as
well as the code of the medical profession in general. 7'
In this case, the medical professional's ethical
obligation is to consent to the wishes of the patient. To
deny Terri her right to self-determination would be an
egregious error on the part of the medical community. To
override clear and convincing evidence that the patient
would want to abstain from life-prolonging treatment in the
event that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state is an
authority not granted to medical professionals by any
ethical code.
Likewise, courts have rejected the argument that the
integrity of the medical profession is an interest compelling
enough to override a patient's interest in self-determination
and autonomy.72 The courts have taken the view that the
medical profession's mission to save lives does not
mandate life-sustaining treatment in all cases, especially
those where the patient's prognosis is very poor or those in
which the patient is in great pain or is permanently
unconscious. 73  In Terri's case, she was in a persistent
vegetative state, and she did not have a prognosis of
recovery. Before her accident, Terri alluded to the fact
that, if she were ever in such a state, she would want the
life-sustaining measures halted so that she would not have
to continue to live in an abnormal manner.74 Courts have
held that there are circumstances where appropriate
medical care is comfort care, rather than life preserving
71 See id. at 664-69.
72 See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So.2d at 163-64 (stating that if the doctrine
of informed consent and privacy have as their foundations bodily
integrity, then those rights are superior to institutional considerations).
7' See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 667.74 See In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 814.
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care. 75 For Terri, the most appropriate care would have
been comfort care, in accordance with her wishes.
Generally, if health care professionals or
institutions object to the withdrawal of treatment on
individual ethical grounds, they will not be forced to act on
the patient's wishes, so long as the patient can be
transferred to another health care provider or institution
that will help effectuate those wishes.76 In order to comply
with Terri's wishes, someone in the medical profession
would not be forced to do something to which he or she
was ethically opposed. Thus, there was no breach of any
medical code of ethics by removing Terri's feeding tube.
For these reasons, the government's interest in maintaining
the integrity of the medical profession is irrelevant because
Terri did not commit suicide, and the professional who
ended this ordeal for her was not forced to do so.
V. The Act Versus Separation of Powers
While the ultimate decision concerning whether
Terri's feeding tube should have been removed will be
debated for many years to come, the effect of Congress's
attempt to circumvent the order of a Florida Court of
Appeals 77 is immediate. There is public sentiment that this
piece of legislation was an attempt on the part of the U.S.
Congress to usurp the authority of state law 78 and wield its
71 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 667 (noting that some
physicians have chosen not to prolong the process of dying for the
patient when it is clear that the patient is in an irreversible condition
and therapy offers neither human nor humane benefit).
76 But see In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1986), affd, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).7 7 1n re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
78FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.305 (West 2005).
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own authority.
79
The Act raises many constitutional inquiries and
should not survive an appeal. Generally, legislative actions
are those that have general application and prospective
effect, not those which are targeted and retroactive. 80 The
Act, however, is not merely legislation, but an attempt to
accomplish something judicial and strictly outside the role
of the legislature. Florida's Constitution clearly mandates
a separation of powers. 8 While these distinctions of power
may overlap at times, it is difficult to find a constitutional
basis for Congress's overruling a court order. The
legislature, dissatisfied with the court order, granted Terri's
parents standing to sue Michael Schiavo, even though the
United States Supreme Court had already ruled that
Congress may not interfere with judicial proceedings.
82
Thus, the legislature should not have granted relief to
Terri's parents because such relief was strictly judicial in
nature. Congress should have adhered to the separation of
powers principle as mandated by the nation's highest court.
It can hardly be argued that the courts are the best
mechanism for determining end-of-life decisions. Because
there is no universal statute to govern such decisions, states
have devised their own statutes regarding who should make
79 Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons From the
Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 115-16 (2004).8o Id. at 117 (quoting Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivi , and Legal Change: An
Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1997)
(explaining that the "general principle that statutes operate
prospectively and judicial decisions apply retroactively is a matter of
black letter law")).
8' See FLA. CONST. ART. II, § 3 ("The powers of the state government
shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.").82 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995).
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end-of-life decisions. If the legislature was diametrically
opposed to the language of a statute, it has the authority to
amend such a statute. This, however, is a matter that
Congress should not have decided by judicial means. The
legislature cannot usurp the power of the courts, especially
after a particular matter has been decided. The courts are
committed to upholding the legislature's authority by
rendering opinions consistent with the statutes, which is
exactly what the court did in Terri's case. 83  The
legislature, in turn, should remain true to the constraints of
the statute, which requires that these matters be decided in
a court of law.
It is important to note that there were alternative
routes the legislature could have followed. For example, a
private bill would not have offended the Constitution on the
scale that Congress's usurpation of judicial power has.
There is no provision in the U.S. Constitution that prohibits
private bills. Because Terri made it clear that she did not
want to live in a persistent vegetative state, as determined
by the Florida courts, 84 it is unlikely that she would have
perceived such a bill as favorable to her cause.
State elected officials take an oath to abide by their
state constitutions. When Congress is allowed to override
the authority of a state constitution, an extreme limitation is
placed on the states' authority-one the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution may not have envisioned. 85 It can be
argued that the separation of powers discussed in the
Florida Constitution 86 is to be respected by the U.S.
Congress. Just as the states are not allowed to infringe on
the decisions of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Congress
83 See In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
84 See id.
85 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
86 See FLA. CONST. ART. II, § 3.
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should not be allowed to overrule decisions made by the
state and wield its own authority.
The other instances in which legislatures have
interfered in family matters have also led to similar results.
The Schiavo case bears some semblance to a recent federal
decision regarding child custody. 87 Dr. Eric Foretich and
his wife, Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, separated while Dr.
Morgan was pregnant with their daughter, and they
divorced shortly after their daughter's birth. 8 The D.C
Superior Court gave custody to Dr. Morgan, while Dr.
Foretich retained visitation rights. 89 Dr. Morgan did not
allow Dr. Foretich to visit his daughter, however, claiming
he had sexually molested the girl. 9° The courts never
found evidence of inappropriate behavior on the part of Dr.
Foretich and jailed Dr. Morgan on contempt of court
charges. 91 Afterward, she fled with her daughter to New
Zealand. 92 At Dr. Morgan's request, Congress passed the
Elizabeth Morgan Act, 93 which allowed Dr. Morgan to
return to the United States without being subjected to the
jurisdiction of the D.C. Superior Court. The Elizabeth
Morgan Act also prevented Dr. Foretich from visiting his
daughter unless his daughter consented. 94 Similar to the
legislature's intervention in the Schiavo case, the Elizabeth
Morgan Act referred specifically to the Morgan-Foretich
dispute. Dr. Foretich contested the legislation arguing it
87 See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003).




92 Id. at 1207.
93 Id. at 1207.
94 Id. at 1208.
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was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, 95 an
argument the U.S. Court of Appeals accepted. 96 The U.S.
Court of Appeals concluded that the Act was a punitive
measure that was designed to separate Dr. Foretich from
his daughter. 97 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
on the legislative history which spoke to the effect of the
Act's aim to "correct an injustice" in the custody dispute. 
98
The Act granting Terri's parent's relief has little
distinction from the Elizabeth Morgan Act. While the Act
passed by Congress on behalf of Terri's parents does not do
the same damage to Michael Schiavo's reputation as the
Elizabeth Morgan Act did to Dr. Foretich's reputation, the
two acts are nonetheless similarly detrimental to the
separation of powers doctrine. The cases are remarkably
similar in that both involve the same questions and
constitutional misgivings. On this basis, the Act violates
the separation of powers doctrine and is therefore void.
VI. Conclusion
Congress's attempt to circumvent the Florida
court's decision regarding the removal of Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube violated her fundamental constitutional rights.
She is guaranteed a right to autonomy 99 and she has a right
to self-determination based on that right. Congress's
attempt to usurp the state court's power not only violated
Terri's constitutional rights, but it also offended the
Framers' intent to afford states autonomy. Furthermore,
Id. at 1208-09.
96Id. at 1226.
97 Id. at 1223.
98 See id. at 1225-26.
99 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (stating
that the right to autonomy is a fundamental constitutional right).
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Congress has failed to show a compelling governmental
interest by which to override the personal choice of Terri
Schiavo. As a result, the Act is not constitutionally sound
and should be overturned on appeal.
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